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This work investigates the changes in Zimbabwe's democratisation trajectory 
presented by the failure and adverse effects of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme in that country. The broad discussion is based on the postulation that 
structural adjustment programmes with their neo-liberal economic foundations, as 
they have been articulated and implemented in Africa have undermined both 
development and democratisation on the continent. The study assesses literature 
around structural adjustment programmes in the continent, exploring its possible 
successes and definite failures. It also discusses the alternatives available to the 
continent in relation to the notions of good governance and its effects on 
development. A mapping of Zimbabwe's experience with adjustment serves as a case 
study from which several conclusions are drawn. Some of these conclusions are that 
the rigidity of adjustment programmes close out democratic processes and result in 
democracy being diminished as well as bypassing novel democratic opportunities. 
This situation for the African continent is worsened by the polarisation of an uneven 
global political economy which by virtue of inherent power relations, undermines 
Africa's economic integration. As such a new and radical move away from neo-
liberalism towards a people-centred democratic, wealth creating developmental 
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1.1 Background Statement 
Over the last SIX years, Zimbabwe has been described as oscillating between 
authoritarianism and democracy. The country has seen thc simultaneous opening and 
closing of political space, the emergence of a significant post-nationalist opposition to 
the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, 
collapse of the national economy, decline in health services and education and 
increase in prominence of the parallel economy. 
Although all aspects of Zimbabwean life - political, social and economic -
have been affected by the current crisis, it is important to note that the crisis is a 
manifestation of a process that started in the mid 1970s and gained momentum in the 
1990s (Bond, 2007: 154/5). Under pressure from International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs), the Zimbabwean government adopted a Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) known as ESAP - Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (Chakaodza, 
1993: 54). Though aimed at economic liberalisation this strategy carried with it 
conditionalities for good governance - opening of political space, respect for human 
rights and the rule oflaw. 
The 1990s have been described as a time of "increased marginalisation of 
Africa in the global system, collapse of national economies, escalation of internal war 
and civil strife, and democratic transition" (Osaghae, 1995: 183). In the 21 st century, 
the global political economy is characterised by nation-states striving for democratic 
stability or peace where it is purported to not exist. Sub-Saharan African 1 countries 
have for the last few decades undergone efforts at democratisation resulting in varying 
levels of success (Diamond, 1988: 3). These efforts have been especially encouraged 
and financially sponsored by creditor institutions, international donor organisations 
(NGOs) as well as external nation-states while supported or resisted by African 
I The tenns sub-Saharan Africa and Africa are used interchangeably but denote reference to Africa 











governments and civil societies within the democratising states (Bratton & van de 
Walle, 1997: 194). 
The rhetoric of "good governance" pervades contemporary African politics. 
States in conflict, those moving towards peace, on the verge of armed violence or 
economic collapse are all faced with the challenge of achieving sustainable 
democracy. The abatement of the Cold War in the early 1990s serves as a significant 
moment in time at which to locate these challenges. The failure of communism meant 
that many African countries formerly aligned to the east and socialist states of the 
Soviet Union, China and Cuba found themselves without international military, 
economic and political support resulting in the toppling of many authoritarian leaders 
(Hentz, 2004: 145). This ideological shift coincided with global economic recession 
that led to a debt crisis especially felt in the Third World. The victors of the Cold 
War, western countries, financed the external debt of the affected states with loans 
administered through the Washington Consensus institutions (Adedeji, 1999: 522). 
These loans created opportunities for western countries to propagate liberal 
democracy to sub Saharan Africa and other regions. The exit of formerly authoritarian 
leaders from politics gave rise to the 'third-wave' of democracy on the continent. 
However, upon reflection of the seemingly optimistic start to the 1990s, it is clear that 
democracy in Africa is happening in "fits and starts" (Fomunyoh, 2001: 49). 
That the 'third wave' of democratisation began, was stalled or continues in the 
African continent is debateable. How it is endogenously pursued is also questionable. 
That it is desired and promoted exogenously is certain, but what is of great interest is 
the extent to which the promotion of democracy from outside of African countries 
will lead to established systems. It is true that external financial assistance is not 
confined to democratic promotion. It also extends to enhancing security and ensuring 
stability in certain regions thus demonstrating the importance of monetary and other 
forms of help (Brown, 2005: 189). However, it is argued that democracy is best 
achieved when initiated and pursued from within a country. With less conditional 
assistance from external agents, African citizens will be better able to develop, 











Conversely, because Africa is arguably the poorest of the developing 
continents IFI assistance is largely dedicated to poverty alleviation and development 
(Akokpari, 2006: 6). These development strategies have translated into African states 
heavy reliance on IFIs while exacerbating the political, economic and social 
inadequacies with little room to deviate from the paths set by these organisations. This 
work argues that IFIs understand the solution to Africa's development issues in terms 
of a neo-liberal framework; essentially that neo-liberal economic reforms will redeem 
Africa out of its underdevelopment. In isolation, such policies are not wholly 
problematic, however, external creditors fund economic liberalisation policies and 
demand simultaneous political reforms. Hence, while IFIs and multilateral creditors 
promote democracy, their priority is economic reform. If economic reform is aimed at 
development it is necessary to pay close attention to the manner in which these 
policies hinder democracy and prevent democratic development (Akokpari, 2006: 8). 
1.2 Objectives 
While focusing on Zimbabwe as a case study this research project illuminates the 
nature of democratisation in Africa as hindered by forces external to the continent and 
explores the relevance of neo-liberalism as appropriate for development. By looking 
closely at ESAP in an attempt to isolate a group of external actors and specific 
conditionalities - both economic and political - the project will argue that despite 
support for the transformation of institutions by adopting transparent and accountable 
practices and personnel, financial support and conditions tied to external assistance 
for development and sometimes political reform undermines the processes of 
democracy and adversely affects its evolution. It will also be argued that the global 
political economy is a polarised system that excludes developing countries and serves 
to keep African states disadvantaged within it. 
Taking advantage of novel political opemngs In Africa is crucial. 
Nevertheless, perhaps more crucial is the manner in which external actors, opposition 
parties, and civics engage in the process and respond appropriately to these 
opportunities. This work is relevant in that it emphasises the need for self evaluation 











they finance and contribute to the growth of democracy and development, there is a 
need to assess the effects of their contribution and reshape their approaches. 
Furthermore, the paper attempts to move away from the rigid dichotomous debate that 
characterises Zimbabwe's crisis as: (i) purely a result of international sabotage and 
putting forward the ruling party as the sole representative of the nation, as advanced 
by the current governing regime and (ii) as solely caused by an authoritarian, corrupt, 
patrimonial, inefficient state, as propagated by critics of the government and 
commentators on the situation. The point is to present a nuanced argument that 
highlights the interface between structural adjustment (neo-liberal economics) and 
democracy. 
1.3 Rationale for the Case of Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is an interesting case with which to test the hypothesis that a simplistic 
understanding of development solutions by creditor countries has diminished the 
prospects of democracy taking root in the country. Brown (2005: 184) argues that 
economic crises within a country produce popular discontent amongst the population, 
affecting even those of the population who may have been staunch supporters of an 
authoritarian regime. Such discontent then ushers in a climate amenable to economic 
and politicalliberalisation. He adds however, that paradoxically, these conditions that 
promote transition, if continual, fail to result in a lasting democracy. This is the case 
in Zimbabwe, where the ruling ZANU-PF regime internationally recognised as 
authoritarian, has implemented varying policies that limit the popular participation of 
citizens in politics as well as infringements upon their human rights. 
Worthy of note is the link between external funding and its subsequent 
withdrawal based on allegations of human rights violations. These claims, though 
valid, blur the initial cause of withdrawal that was in response to: the commitment of 
Zimbabwean troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1998, mass 
payouts to liberation struggle war veterans in the same year and the government's 
silent approval of invasions on white owned commercial farms followed by enactment 
of policy to nationalise and redistribute land (Landsberg, 2000: 1 08). In other words, it 











the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) (Goldsmith, 2001: 416). 
This places emphasis on the overlap often ignored by IFIs and other observers of the 
economic and political with regard austerity measures. 
As such the study is located in a critique of Structural Adjustment as 
determining development agendas in Africa, its links to democratisation and 
Zimbabwe's particular experience in this regard. External actors are generally 
identified as IFIs and other creditor agencies; these institutions personify the 
economic liberalisation efforts in the form of SAP. The discussion will also attempt to 
understand external action in relation to ties of the main opposition party, Movement 
for Democratic Change (MDC), and how these interlocking issues have contributed to 
the political and economic crisis in the country. 
1.3.1 Zimbabwe's Democracy 
Democratic indices in the 1990s recorded Zimbabwe as being a semi-democratic state 
or a one-party democracy distinguishing it from 'third wave' democracies. Bhebhe 
and Ranger (2001), Dashwood (2000) and Sithole (1988) debated the nature of 
Zimbabwe's democracy, but because of the advances in the economy, education, 
industry and agriculture at independence, there was general optimism concerning its 
entrenchment. A look at the country's international status in 2007, however, presents 
a different picture. The Freedom House index of freedom classifies Zimbabwe as "not 
free", in other words having very low to non-existent levels of democracy, or as being 
an authoritarian system (Country Report: Zimbabwe, 2006). 
Democratisation in Zimbabwe is at a crossroads, manifested in economic and 
political crisis. The crisis is also emphasised because the government of Zimbabwe 
has fallen out of favour with western countries. The reasons for this also serve as 
evidence of the crisis and democracy's dilemma. This is reflected in: increased 
repression of the state and associated violence around elections, the rigging of these, 
severe economic downturn characterised by hyper-inflation and resulting in untold 
adversity of the masses, state advocated land invasions accompanied by compromise 
of the rule of law and the mass emigration of millions of mostly skilled Zimbabweans 











This study aims to show that the above events have served as instruments by 
which Zimbabwe's claim of being democratic has been tested and not necessarily 
failed. It will be argued that Zimbabwe is on a different democratic trajectory contrary 
to opinion that claims it has no chance of success, has failed, never existed or has 
been hijacked (Makumbe, 2002: 99), (Lloyd, 2002) and (Bush & Szeftel, 2002: 9). By 
examining Zimbabwe's experience with neo-liberal economic policies the study aims 
to show that economic conditionalities led to the breakdown of what was imagined to 
be a democracy and detracted from opportunities to capitalise on the political 
openings created by the policies' effects. A further postulation is that the current 
economic and political crisis, if strategically and imaginatively exploited by entities 
both within Zimbabwe and abroad, can result in an entrenchment of a democracy that 
serves the people of the country. 
1.3.2 Economic and Political Liberalisation Efforts 
The link between SAPs and democratisation is not direct but is one that requires 
investigation. SAPs have had adverse effects on African populations, especially the 
most vulnerable groups. African states have been forced to discontinue many social 
welfare programmes resulting in increased poverty and unemployment (Mkandawire 
& Soludo, 1999: xii). This deprivation has caused public outcry against these policies. 
However, because the reforms are tied to debt financing, governments have seen fit to 
implement autocratic measures and repress public protest. During the ESAP years in 
Zimbabwe, students involved in demonstration against adjustment on the various 
tertiary institution campuses experienced this repression at the hands of state security 
agents, including being fired at with tear gas (Nhema, 2002: 131). 
Unlike Ghana and Uganda, Zimbabwe's economic success with ESAP has 
been limited perhaps because of the varied political openings and opportunities that 
arguably existed prior to ESAP for civil society in general. Exploiting these while 
economic reform unfolded meant that the state lost political power and continuing 
with ESAP meant losing sovereignty to IFIs; showing what Bush and Szeftel (2002: 











the Zimbabwean state regained sovereignty but at the expense of political 
liberalisation or rather forging a new democratic path. 
1.3.3 International Involvement 
The issue of sovereignty is further emphasised through Zimbabwe's international 
relationships. International engagement in the current Zimbabwean crisis has been 
characterised by backing of the opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC), in an effort to see regime change in Zimbabwe while applying smart 
sanctions on key government officials in addition to withholding loans. The 
international world has also taken exception to the 'Fast Track' land policy 
implemented by the government in 2000. In this respect, the MDC joined forces, with 
external actors and white Zimbabwean farmers in admonishment of the government 
advocated 'land grabs'. 
Though difficult to pinpoint, funding for the opposition MDC came from both 
within and outside the country (Zimbabwe: Galvanising Change, 2006: 16578C). 
Internal monetary support came mainly from white commercial farmers who stood to 
lose a great deal from the government's Land Reform policies. This endorsement of 
the MDC initially led to an unprecedented level of opposition support, a kind that had 
been unknown since soon after the country's independence. In the recent past, it has 
seemingly waned because of uncertainty over the MDC's allegiances (Bond & 
Manyanya, 2002: xiv) Thus, in terms of sustaining, strengthening or ushering III 
democracy, the perceived long term effects of external support has been a de-
legitimation of the party in the eyes of ZANU-PF elite and most importantly in the 
hearts and souls of the masses who associate their suffering with external actors and 
barred access to wealth creation in the form of landownership (Dansereau, 2003: 173). 
1.4 Research Question 
How have conditionality packages hindered democracy and contributed to the current 












Conditionalities in the fonn of Structural Adjustment Programmes have hampered 
Zimbabwe's democracy because of the adverse effects of economic refonn as well as 
the contradictory nature of economic and politicalliberalisation. 
1.6 Methodology 
This study is primarily descriptive with the methodology based on desk and library 
research. The work is reliant on secondary sources by way of books, journal articles, 
reports, working papers and Internet sources. 
1. 7 Synopsis 
The study is separated into chapters. Chapter one provides a background to the study 
as well as delineating the objectives, research question and hypothesis. Chapter two 
addresses structural adjustment in Africa and interrogates the nature of the economic 
refonn regimes, the extent of their success on the continent and neo-liberalism' s 
relevance as a developmental agenda. The second section takes a glimpse into some 
literature on democracy - particularly in Africa - and associated notions of good 
governance, ideas of liberal democracy and most importantly the relationship between 
economic development - in the fonn of structural adjustment - and democratisation. 
Chapter three is a case study on Zimbabwe, beginning with a background to the case 
that includes discussion of: the land issue, the nature of the one party state and 
opposition politics, external relations and the current crisis. Through the lens of 
ESAP, this chapter also describes the political and economic effects of adjustment, 
identifies the political or democratic openings created by these effects and highlights 
some roots of the current crisis. It concludes that ESAP weakened democracy in 
Zimbabwe. Dedicated to recommendations and conclusions, chapter four posits the 
need for systemic change in the global political economy. It puts forward possibilities 
for the notion of' African democracy' and suggests alternative models of development 












OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND AFRICA 
2.1.1 Structural Adjustment or Neo-liberal Economic Reforms 
SAPs are packages of neo-liberal economIC reforms which are implemented by 
borrower governments in exchange for financial aid. As a grouping, these 
commitments to act are known as conditionalities (Akonor, 2006: 1). According to 
Akonor (2006: 1) IFI conditionality consists of macroeconomic policy reform. These 
reforms typically aim to improve supply side efficiency and resource allocation by 
allowing the market freedom to determine prices, allow free market competition, 
remove state subsidies, privatise state owned businesses and float or devalue 
currency. They also as stimulate economic growth on the demand side by lowering 
tariffs, remove quotas and exchange controls. "Conditionality then, is a compensation 
mechanism that allows IFIs such as the IMF, to monitor behaviour and provide 
incentives for compliance with the policies that are part of its programmes" (Akonor, 
2006: 2). 
SAPs find their origin in the 'Washington Consensus', a term used to refer to 
Washington based and supported financial institutions that have since the 1970s 
endorsed and advanced neo-liberal and or free market approaches to mostly 
developing states' economic policies (Bond, 2002: 1). The Washington Consensus 
was initially expressed through economic, social and environmental policy, and 
though these are arrived at through specific political decision making processes, since 
the 1990s, the Washington Consensus became closely linked to policies and/ or 
conditions that openly directed political decision making. 
Neo-liberal economic, social and environmental policies are derived from cost 
benefit analyses whose aims are to reach the most profitable outcome (Bond, 2002: 
1). When these policies are applied to developing states or their statesmen have been 











profits become questionable. Is it the reforming state that benefits - as a whole - or 
are benefits mainly for the institution providing financing for the reforms or the state 
associated to the institution? Lapeyre (2004: 5) and Cotton and Ramachandran (2003: 
213) chalk it down to "a major global preoccupation to liberalise the economies of 
developing countries. 
2.1.2 Africa's Success with SAPs 
Adebayo Adedeji, the former Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa (ECA), notes the reluctance of IFIs to recognise the need for 
exploring the social aspect of development policies for African states (Adedeji, 1999: 
521). He credits the World Bank however, as having made paradigmatic shifts 
towards social issues. Adedeji states that SAPs have had dire effects on African 
economies, especially resulting in the increase and severity of poverty. As such SAPs 
in Africa, unlike in some Asian countries, have failed, resulting in the rigidifying of 
the nature of African economies (Adedeji, 1999: 522). 
According to Adedeji (1999: 523/4) SAPs distorted African economic growth, 
in other words negative growth instead of high levels of growth, because of the overly 
competitive world markets that African states were required to compete in. An 
assumption made by IFIs in the heyday of SAPs was that growth was equal to 
reduction in or reversal of poverty, whereas, growth and poverty eradication proved to 
not be synonymous in Africa. Adedeji thus calls for a need to focus on these plights as 
well as inequality and inequity so as to reverse the erosion of the emergent African 
middle classes witnessed at the implementation of SAPs (Adedeji, 1999: 525). 
An intricate part of the SAP cycle are the excessive amounts of foreign debt 
preventing African economies from moving forward. SAPs only succeed in increasing 
debt by deferring repayment until a much later time when usually the interest on 
initial loans far exceeds the principal. Despite all the fanfare surrounding the lobbying 
of 08 countries to forgive the debt of Third World countries, Adedeji (1999: 527) 
emphasises that lender countries and institutions force borrowers to repay, "creditor 











These enforced repayments carry enormous social significance that is mostly ignored 
by lenders and in addition debt is wielded by creditor states as a major political 
instrument of power over African states. 
Adedeji (1999: 527) conclusively observes that in order for SAP to have some 
meaning for the African continent, lessons need to be learnt from Asian countries and 
their experiences with SAP. The most important of these being to fully develop 
human resources in the continent and ensure the retention of highly skilled 
individuals; this retention can be ensured through increased public spending for those 
employed by the state, but also ensuring transparent processes in recruitment and 
hiring. Although seemingly in contradiction with the thinking behind SAPs, Adedeji 
(1999: 527) encourages increased state involvement in the economy. 
Although the SAPs have not alleviated the poverty and inequality known in 
the continent it must also be borne in mind that the exact contribution of adjustment to 
the plight of African peoples is not certain (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 20). 
2.1.3 Impediments to SAPs in Africa 
The above concludes that SAPs have been unsuccessful in the continent simply based 
on the fact that they have not achieved their intended economic outcome. The greatest 
result of SAPs has been that economies have failed to adjust in ways that facilitate 
growth and changing the fortunes of African countries in the global economy. As such 
this has led to a rise in levels of inequality and poverty as well as adverse effects 
faced by the most vulnerable of society. The erosion of political liberties and abuse of 
human rights is another impact that SAPs have had on African populations and one in 
which this work is most concerned (Ndulo, 2003 :334). 
Many evaluations of SAPs hypothesise that African governments failed at 
implementing SAPs because of their failure at governance. Weak, unaccountable, 
corrupt, inefficient and most of all, patrimonial, repressive and authoritarian 
governments have been blamed for the failure of SAPs. However, Bonny Ibhawoh 











authoritarian character of their implementation and the subsequent infringement on 
human rights and political liberties and participation have not been sufficiently 
considered. Though the era of SAPs as they were known in the 1980s and 1990s has 
been and gone, what Ibhawoh emphasises is the lack of this recognition in future 
policy making. 
Ibhawoh (1999: 158) argues that SAPs created, or perhaps even in their new 
forms create, crises of legitimacy for African states and their incumbent regimes. 
These crises of legitimacy are often arrived at because the adverse effects of 
implementing SAPs were in many cases, as in Zimbabwe, felt in the immediate short 
term post implementation. Those most affected by the reform policies were the 
working and lower middle classes, so in the case of Zimbabwe these were, the rural 
dwellers, peasant farmers and low income earners in the urban areas (Chakaodza, 
1993: 66). The various affected people then began to speak out and demonstrate 
against the ruling regimes, demanding there be a response to their plight. Because 
governments had no options but to carry out SAPs to the letter, they were most often 
unable to intervene in the market to ease the pressures for their populations. Instead, 
some of these already dictatorial and authoritarian governments resorted to even more 
repressive strategies so as to carry out reforms (Ibhawoh, 1999: 158). 
A claim that IFIs deliberately supported "the authoritarian political actions of 
adjusting states would not be true (Ibhawoh, 1999: 58). However, that they turned a 
blind eye to state repression on demonstrating and protesting populations in many 
countries such as Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea and Zimbabwe, at the expense ofrolling out 
reforms, is indisputable (Ibhawoh, 1999: 159). Furthermore, these types of state 
repression are contrary to the rhetoric of politicalliberalisation espoused, limitedly by 
IF Is but quite seriously by other funders and creditor organisations (Ibhawoh, 1999: 
158). IFIs therefore implicitly encourage "authoritarianism and human rights 
violations by insisting on politically difficult conditionalities in the implementation of 
economic reforms" (Ibhawoh, 1999: 158). This encouragement, accompanied by 
vague admonitions in response to repression, merely leads to further repression and 











Unfortunately, once a culture of impunity has been established with no 
prospect of action taken against the offender, it is too late to respond at a later stage. 
The W orId Bank and IMF initiated SAP regime is a prime mechanism used in 
rigidifying the skewed power dynamics of the global political economy. When these 
institutions that represent the powerhouses of the global political economy do no act 
in ways they are expected, one then questions the sincerity in advocating and 
commitment to upholding human rights and democratic ideals and, whether these 
should be ideals African countries should be attempting to uphold. 
African countries are expected to achieve and maintain certain democratic 
standards yet are sUbjected to undemocratic decision-making institutions in order to 
reach these. One of the problems arises because the implementation of SAPs requires 
that states deviate from a "long tradition of government intervention" in their 
economIes (Ibhawoh, 1999: 159). Such deviation towards a redefined notion of 
government or governance takes away power from the state and puts it into the hands 
of the IFIs and other bodies. Within individual states, it becomes uncertain as to 
where the control of political power and hence sovereignty goes. 
Ibhawoh (1999: 160) makes this clear when he refers to two levels of 
authoritarianism in formulating and implementing SAP in Africa. The first is 
"international authoritarianism" practised by IFIs through their imposition of the 
cumbersome economic policies in return for assistance. On the second level is 
domestic authoritarianism practised by the incumbent regimes. It would seem that the 
latter could not happen as effectively without the former. 
Some scholars argue that authoritarianism is necessary for effective 
implementation of SAP while others claim that SAPs result in authoritarian 
tendencies, or exacerbate where they already existed (Ibhawoh, 1999: 160). 
Whichever is the more true hypothesis, the fact remains that "adjustment's insistence 
on the termination of [the African state's] traditional popular and national basis which 
obliges it to resort to dictatorship"; this dictatorship is both during the time of reforms 











On the other hand Uganda and Tanzania are considered cases of successful 
adjustment. These Graham Harrison (2001: 672) refers to as selective cases to be 
considered as part of the post-conditionality regime. In such a regime the discussion 
on adjustment has to be taken beyond simply viewing relations between donor and 
lender institutions as representative of dichotomous interests. Rather, the interests and 
objectives of the states and creditors have been consolidated through the joint 
absorption of ideas pertaining to development and economic growth (Harrison, 2001: 
661). 
The importance of post-conditionality regimes is an emphasis on the fact that 
m some cases relationships with creditors are not solely based on the threat of 
punitive measures through sanction (Harrison, 2001: 658). In these post-conditionality 
regimes, there is an effort to divert the development discourse away from the political 
sphere and place it purely within the economic through establishing relationships and 
changing developmental ideology through certain economic ministries such as finance 
(Harrison, 2001: 668). As such creditors are integrated into policy making methods, 
thus taking away autonomy from the state. The emphasis here is that the post-
conditionality regime moves away from broad and verbose macro-level policy 
dictates to more subtle micro-level directing. In so doing lenders guarantee policy 
outcomes representing supposedly mutual objectives of relevant state actors 
(Harrison, 2001: 671). This is necessitated because creditors have to be able to claim 
some benefit in adjustment (Harrison, 2001: 661). 
Furthermore such a relationship is beneficial for the borrowing state. Despite 
the coercive nature of the conditionality regime, for finance ministers and experts 
with ideology contrary to their political counterparts, the potential of withdrawal of 
funding is removed from the political incumbents (Harrison, 2001: 668). This is not a 
sustainable position, as history has shown, eventually political buy in is necessary. It 
is necessary to ensure that other development aspects such as political, social, health 
and humanitarian are not sidelined in favour of economic reform or the sake of 
declaring adjustment successful. Also care must be taken to not allow political 
repression for the sake of economic adjustment. Even in Uganda, creditors and IFIs 
eventually had to insist that Museveni's no-party democracy be reconsidered 











economic adjustment objectives, there will be a negative relationship between donors, 
lenders and the state. Those who bear the brunt are the poor. 
2.1.4 Beyond structural adjustment 
Some Africanists argue that SAPs are an outdated issue and because in a sense they 
are no longer being implemented or discussed as potential aspects of developmental 
strategies, there is nothing new that can be added to the debate. In fact, there is no 
longer a debate. This argument is steeped in the notion that "sub-Saharan Africa is 
[not] locked within a regime of conditionality" (Harrison, 2001: 657). This, to an 
extent, is a valid assessment of the subject; however, when looking at the types of 
economic and developmental strategies proposed by development agencies, donor 
organisations and IFIs, it is imperative that one recognise the similarities in the 
proposals to that of SAPs. To realise that these policies and recommendations, though 
cloaked in different jargon and rhetoric, still outline very similar ideas to that of 
SAPs. 
In this vein Nicolas van de Walle (2003) and others focus on the institutional 
context of African Development, post Structural Adjustment. In their work, van de 
Walle and colleagues address the new developmental dispensation ushered into the 
continent as a result of SAPs. Van de Walle (2003: 2) refers to non-governmental 
organisations that emerged as a result of increased creditor and donor funding that 
poured into various African states, alongside IFI loans. These NGOs he identifies as 
emerging to spearhead and propel development in the continent in a manner that calls 
the role of the state or its centrality into question. He posits that "the donor 
community has advanced a fairly idealised version of current evolution that suggests 
that a distinctly African model of development" has emerged and in such a model the 
role tends to assume an uninvolved role (van de Walle, 2003: 2). His general 
assessment of Africa post SAPs is founded on the premise that SAPs have not enabled 
African states and/ or economies to be self reliant and sufficient. As such, he notes the 
necessity to explore the effects of funding that will lead to African governments 












Although van de Walle and others are not directly propagating neo-liberal 
economic policies through adjustment and reform as the developmental path for 
African states, they do clearly make the links between the two themes, development 
and adjustment, as well as tying the debate to issues of good governance and 
democratisation (van de Walle, 2003: 3). He emphasises the continued need for good 
governance through what he coins "democratisation of public life", suggesting that 
the calls for political liberalisation, made by IF Is and creditor donor organisations are 
yet to be heeded by African states (van de Walle, 2003: 3). 
Arthur Goldsmith generally assesses the effect that SAPs had on the capability 
and capacity of the African state, or in his own words "state administrative capability" 
(Goldsmith, 2003: 183). Contrary to Washington and even Post Washington 
Consensus sentiment, Goldsmith (2003: 183) acknowledges that the African state has 
a critical role to play in development and points out that the "foreign aid 
establishment" can be partly blamed for the problems of African states. In his opinion 
however, this argument has been over stated and his paper focuses on the extent to 
which this notion can be held true. He describes how "IFIs and bilateral foreign 
assistance agencies stand accused of inadvertently encouraging a system of fragile, 
powerless states that trap the region in economic backwardness" that births 
authoritarian types of states (Goldsmith, 2003: 183). 
The reason for the falsity of this argument is focused on administrative rather 
than economic outcomes, which reveal that African states, infact, have more capacity 
or capability than is often acknowledged (Goldsmith, 2003: 184). His survey of 
administrative outcomes in relation to amounts of foreign funding shows relatively 
little evidence that state capacity, across the region, has been eroded or diminished 
because of assistance. He, however, acknowledges that the long term impact of 
development assistance or aid is difficult to ascertain as there is a multitude of 
variables such as incorrect strategies implemented by states, conflicting ideas of IFIs 
and the lack of domestic accountability (Goldsmith, 2003: 205). 
This work attempts to highlight a need to look beyond simply using aid as 
agreed by the various parties, but rather that there is a view to investing in the long 











change of institutions. This will contribute to loan effectiveness and IFI policy 
reconsideration. 
Cotton and Ramachandran (2003: 213) are of the OpInIOn that economIC 
structural adjustment reforms in response to pressures from IFIs and bilateral donors 
were generally unsuccessful. Their argument however does not lay blame at the feet 
of IFIs and multilateral donors and do not necessarily propose an alternative to SAPs, 
rather they appear to suggest more direct, refined and deliberate implementation of 
certain SAP policies and strategies. Their discussion revolves around the argument 
that the immediate source of African economic growth lies in foreign direct 
investment (FDI). This thesis is based on evidence that the global surge in FDI to 
developing countries experienced during the 1990s bypassed the continent (Cotton & 
Ramachandran, 2003: 214). This missed opportunity is blamed on the African states 
themselves and the cause directly identified as high risks faced by private investors 
because of the weaknesses in governance, or in other words, lack of good governance. 
These issues of governance do not affect foreign investors in isolation. The two 
authors identifY local entrepreneurs and business communities as being significantly 
affected by the lack of transparency by the state, low quality of business specific laws, 
lack of policies and regulations that protect business, inefficiencies in implementing 
institutions and the inconsistencies in the rule of law and corruption (Cotton & 
Ramachandran, 2003: 218). 
The above observations can be identified as part of the hangover of SAPs, 
generally calling for a reduced level of involvement in the economy by the state. 
Cotton and Ramachandran (2003: 217) suggest changes that need to be made in 
governance that would result in increased levels of and improved investment, thus 
leading to growth. In terms of transparency, and beneficial business laws, they point 
to the important roles of entrepreneurs and the local business community as pressure 
groups able to debate and suggest the formulation and implementation by the state of 
certain policy, as well as being able to contribute in investment terms to development. 
As shall be noted in the case study, the Zimbabwean business community was 
very visibly vocal in lobbying the state against implementing ESAP though the failure 











detennined rolling out of IMF and World Bank proposed policy; to the detriment of 
this community that did not desire the policies that would supposedly benefit them. 
Cotton and Ramachandran (2003: 217) further allude to the issues of ethnicity 
with regard weak governance and its effect on business related regulations. The main 
focus being that in African states, business communities are defined in tenns of or 
identified as ethnic minorities. Though the point of this argument is somewhat 
unclear, what they seem to be purporting is that concentrating on minority control or 
dominance of the private sector detracts from the fact that this demographic can 
significantly contribute to development. This argument however, does not take into 
consideration the reality of the post-colonial African state or rather private sector. 
Owing to the extremely racialised nature of Africa's colonisation, the post-colonial 
private sector in the continent is dominated by ethnic minorities and mostly those not 
indigenous to the continent. Proffering an argument along the lines that refonns in 
governance should be made such that more freedoms are afforded to those minorities 
already in business, in ways that allow them to commandeer more of local economies 
and stand to accrue more wealth to a smaller section of the population, actually fails 
to make significant contributions to the type of development needed for the continent; 
development based on wealth creation. 
Our case study makes this issue quite clear. That the issue of land refonn and 
redistribution in Zimbabwe significantly contributed to the current crisis is 
indisputable. This pertinent matter rose out of the country's colonial history which left 
large tracks of arable land in the hands of the white minority of the population, 
resulting in the majority black and peasant population, dependent on subsistence 
fanning, having little to no access to wealth creation, let alone for survival. Based on 
Cotton and Ramachandran's (2003: 218) arguments about the post-structural 
adjustment state, it would seem that they advocate continued ownership of resources 
by the incumbent minority groups as this group has the best expertise for investment 
and development. The resultant crisis in Zimbabwe makes it clear that indeed 
adjustment policies that seek to reinforce and not reverse colonial and post-colonial 











It is true that there is a need to increase and improve investment opportunities 
in the region. What remains questionable is the group of individuals who benefit from 
these opportunities in such a way that engenders development and redemption out of 
poverty for the majority of populations in African states (Cotton & Ramachandran, 
2003: 233). This brings to the fore some of the grey areas related to reduced 
government involvement in the economy where pertinent issues of population wide 
development can potentially be overlooked or ignored by private sector, IFIs and 
multilateral aid agencies. 
2.1.5 Neo-liberalism as developmental agenda for African countries 
2.1.5.1 The appropriateness ofneo-liberalism 
In conducting an overview of the literature on SAP with regard to Zimbabwe and 
perhaps African states as a whole, one notes a contradiction in deciding whether or 
not the decisions to undertake reforms are judged as good or bad. Such a judgement 
assists one in determining whether or not neo-liberalism in its entirety was/ is the right 
format of Africa's developmental agenda. Furthermore, such a determination would 
then assist one to place international actors, be they IF Is, foreign governments and 
international donor agencies, firmly within the causal explanation of Zimbabwe's 
current economic and political crisis and hence the collapse of democracy. 
Indeed, it is impossible to make facile statements regarding good or bad, 
however, the majority of the literature faults governments, and more specifically the 
Zimbabwean government, for failing on SAP (or reversing SAP after it failed) with 
blame being attributed to incorrect implementation or lack of capacity (Mumvuma, 
Mujajati and Mufute, 2006: 242/53). In addition, much attention is paid to the timing 
and sequencing of SAP but in many instances this comes across as an admonition for 
implementing reforms to begin with. It would seem it is necessary for these 
commentators to put themselves out on a limb and state whether SAPs holistically are 











For an author like Akonor (2006: 5), his main concern with SAP or more 
specifically conditionality, is explaining the non-compliance of African governments 
to SAPs and or conditionality; the underlying assumption being that the problem does 
not lie with the SAPs but with the borrower governments. To an extent, he attributes 
this non-compliance to "domestic incapacities" as do Mumvuma et al (2006: 242/53) 
but his primary argument is based on the realist or rational choice thinking that states 
at the end will always act to maximise benefits, minimise costs and maintain control 
(Brown, 2005: 40). 
These cost-benefit analyses though initially taking into consideration the entire 
population, where non-compliance kicks in is at the point where the political tenure of 
elites appears to be threatened. "Decision outcomes to comply with conditionality are 
based on a cost-benefit calculation by recipient countries" (Akonor, 2006: 5). 
Furthermore, despite attractive or beneficial incentives, as long as the longevity of 
political tenure of a regime is at stake, mechanisms that cause a government to 
comply with the conditions are limited in their power. As valid as these sentiments 
may be, it is however necessary to bear in mind that the role of IFIs in influencing 
recipient governments is not then null and void. On the contrary, though borrowing 
states maintain the power to renege on conditionality agreements, IF Is playa major 
role in the implementation of SAPs and have a responsibility to take potential 
outcomes into consideration. 
Frederic Lapeyre (2004: 1) situates the discussion on structural adjustment 
within a globalisation paradigm and questions the two as developmental tools and 
directions for developing countries. He surmises that "economic globalisation" is a 
key feature of the lives of those he terms social and economic actors globally. He 
further proffers that SAPs need to move away from the one-path developmental 
model put forward by the Washington Consensus and that development policies 
"should reflect the diversity of socio-economic contexts and the specific conditions 
for a pro-poor and pro-social justice integration" of peoples around the world 
(Lapeyre, 2004: 1). His general argument being that globalisation has to be inclusive 
of developing states that currently exist on the margins of globalisation. Eyoh and 
Sandbrook (2001: 2) conversely advocate a more deliberate approach putting forward 










The role of politics and power is undeniable in economic policy and structural 
transformation; as such the global political economy must take cognisance and 
incorporate the effects of these issues. Although the renewed SAPs of the late 1990s 
had a pro-poor orientation, these did not alter the global political economic dynamics 
at all. In the case of Zimbabwe that had already adopted ESAP at the start of the 
decade, the most vulnerable groups in the country had already begun to be severely 
affected. As such, a general observation gleaned from Lapeyre's (2004: 11) work is 
that Bretton Woods policy packages (SAPs) have "fostered increasing inequalities 
within countries where they have been implemented. Not only did SAPs result in 
inequalities within countries, but also exacerbated global inequalities and deemed 
false the notion that the continent would benefit from globalisation through SAPs. 
Other than increased levels of global inequality and poverty, neo-liberalism 
has also worked to erode many efforts towards fostering and increasing political 
participation. Although Lapeyre (2004: 15) does not necessarily introduce a new issue 
to the broader discussion on SAPs, the importance of this point lies in a call he makes 
for the reconsideration of "orthodox view of liberalisation as the main policy tool for 
growth" in developing countries. In his view it is imperative that a new development 
paradigm focus on poverty-reduction policies, participation and ownership in 
decision-making processes. Notably however, he does not recommend a move away 
from neo-liberalism as an ideology or paradigm for formulating economic policies; 
this is common to many authors outside of dependency theorists. 
This begs a question of the extent to which Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) recently introduced by the IMF and World Bank will be successful. If as 
Lapeyre (2004: 18) and others like Mumvuma et al (2006: 261) correctly conclude 
that a problem of SAPs was lack of consultation and participation, it would be 
absolutely necessary that PRSPs amend this omission. Lapeyre (2004: 18) himself 
observes that although the logic behind PRSPs promotes country led and country 
owned policies, as a development assistance strategy they do not promote 
participation and the basic needs of the poor. The PRSPs though addressing economic 
growth and poverty reduction on a macro level lack by not addressing the basic needs 











participation at all in development, given that reliance is placed on foreign assistance 
and aid. 
Because development is not a "gradual or harmonious process" the potential 
for social conflict when faced with various aspects of development initiatives is high 
(Lapeyre, 2004: 18). Lapeyre emphasises the need for participatory processes and 
democratic regimes to ensure that concerns regarding risks of change are fully 
considered and addressed. These comments cannot be disputed, what must be 
clarified however are the individuals or groups of individuals that should take 
participation into cognisance. It is a postulation of this paper that more than the onus 
being solely on developing countries, the international donors and aid givers must 
seriously consider participation and consultation. "Participation [ ... ] is essential to 
making systemic change more acceptable" (Lapeyre, 2004: 18) but this systemic 
change cannot be confined to the economic structure of an African country. Serious 
considerations are required for systemic change in the global political economy to 
ensure that all benefit from the phenomenon of the age, globalisation. 
Furthermore, the harmonisation of IFI proposed policies that favour neo-
liberalism with UN promoted Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) as suggested 
by Lapeyre (2004: 21) is also dubious. Although it is true that considerations of 
humanity need to be attached to developmental policy, history has made it clear that 
IFIs do not support or fund development strategies that present alternatives to neo-
liberalism; again the question of global political economic inequalities and power 
structures is highlighted. What Lapeyre (2004: 22) and others call for is the redesign 
of SAPs to move towards clearly defined human development goals such as the UN 
projected ones. Such a call is exceedingly problematic in nature. This is because 
although he does advocate "deep restructuring of the international architecture to 
improve global governance" and relieve the effects of the vulnerability of poor and 
weak countries, at no juncture does he question the veracity of claims that SAP and 
neo-liberalism are "crucial to good integration of developing and/ or African countries 











2.1.5.2 The shortcomings of neo-liberalism 
The extent to which neo-liberalism can lead to "just development" is clearly excluded 
from the continued insistence on this ideology that shapes development strategy 
(Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 1). Eyoh and Sandbrook (2001:3) loosely define just 
development as "sustained growth with a degree of equity". Like Lapeyre (2004), 
they note a move by IFIs away from "pure neo-liberalism" to a more pragmatic type 
that tries to put a human face to economic reform; basing their evaluation on the 
insufficiency at the Bank's efforts to broaden their development approaches. 
Of great concern is the degree to which continuing along the path of neo-
liberalism, whether pragmatic or pure, will fulfil Ibhawoh' s prophecy of the reality of 
repressive and authoritarian states. Eyoh and Sandbrook (2001: 4) explain that 
pragmatic neo-liberalism bears noteworthy resemblance to the "Third Way" road map 
of development for key industrial countries in the global economy. This "Third Way" 
mainly focuses on supply-side activities of economies to enhance the capabilities or 
capacity of citizens, firms and national economies to contend in the worldwide market 
economy (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 4). Part of this "Third Way" encouraged by 
especially Britain and the US insists upon a more vigorous role for the state in 
economics and politics than that promulgated by the pure neo-liberalism of Reagan 
and Thatcher. Herein lie the contradictions of Western designed and initiated 
development policies for Africa. The call for state facilitated reform and political 
liberalisation do not seem to be simultaneously attainable. 
There is a seemmg obsession with democratising Africa according to the 
Western liberal model of democracy, the belief being that if even minimum standards 
of democracy are embraced, economic reform can take place. The type of democracy 
thus envisioned for Africa by IFIs and donor agencies is electoral democracy, with 
confidence being placed in the notion that a commitment to reform is guaranteed 
because potential beneficiaries would rally behind a reforming party and that interests 
founded on policy reforms will prevail (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 6). Furthermore 
there is a prevailing assumption that there is an acceptance by African policy makers 











to reject any form of state-led development in favour of macro-economic stability 
(Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 18). 
Again it is clear that a problematic feature of initiating and formulating 
policies for the continent has not been considered. The nature of African governments 
and governing structures has to be taken into consideration, but not merely in such a 
way that identifies the problem and prescribes a solution, rather to identify and work 
with these governments to find suitable solutions. The issues of political support and 
patron-client relationships are paramount to African governments. So, though the 
experts within finance ministries and central banks may be supportive of neo-liberal 
policies and programmes, their political counter-parts and superiors may initially 
support but soon tum away from them, when they infringe and threaten their political 
tenure (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 8). As will be made clear in the following chapter, 
Mumvuma et al (2006: 241) note that this political expediency was a chief reason 
behind Zimbabwe's seeming indecision in committing to ESAP, non-compliance and 
eventual abandonment of ESAP. Furthermore, the government's continued efforts at 
implementing nationalistic economic policies and reform strategies belie the notion 
that state interference in the economy is an ill-favoured strategy". 
One can with certainty conclude that neo-liberalism, in its current form, as a 
development agenda for Africa will not work. Though pragmatic neo-liberalism in the 
form of World Bank and IMF proposed PRSPs and the Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facilities have added a "human face" to development, the reality of 
amplified susceptibility and exclusion of the African peasantry will not abate (Eyoh & 
Sandbrook, 2001: 35). Eyoh and Sandbrook (2001: 36) refer to the neo-liberal 
complex to privatise and create individual based free markets in opposition to 
communal property rights and arrangements that ensure equality and prevent 
marginalisation. As long as IFIs, multi and bilateral donor agencies and African states 
themselves fail to imagine a way to incorporate characteristic features of African 
production practices neo-liberalism will fix the continent on the periphery of the 
global political economy. 
Africa's democratic expenence, the notion of good governance and the interface 











2.2 African democracy - the issues 
2.2.1 Defining democracy 
A single universal definition of democracy has eluded many scholars of political 
science. As with concepts such as power and development, the concept of democracy 
has been interpreted to suit particular analyses and projects. Bratton and van de Walle 
(1997: 13) define democracy "as a form of political regime in which citizens choose, 
in competitive elections the occupants of the top political offices of the state". 
Villalon and Von Doepp (2005 :2) define it as a system characterised by institutions 
that constrain the behaviour of political elites. This form of political regime is 
dependent on the observance of political freedoms and rights within a framework of 
varying civil liberties; these must exist prior to elections to then be able to claim that 
democracy exists and a new kind of political regime is in place. 
Added definitions refer to democracy as being recognised in three ways: an 
acceptance of the "rules of the game" by all political contenders, existence of an 
electoral system and the "robustness" of a democratic system (Beetham, 1994: 160). 
This paper proffers an understanding of democracy - African democracy - as 
characterised by taking advantage of novel political openings resulting in increased 
political opportunities and not necessarily resulting in the establishment of new 
systems as literature on transitions and consolidation would suggest (Remmer, 1995: 
104). As such many scholars on democracy omit a discussion of external conditions 
as "facilitating" or debilitating these opportunities. When considering the extent of 
funding made available for development and democracy promotion, the need to 
investigate external "facilitating conditions" becomes necessary (Beetham, 1994: 
161). 
2.2.2 Defining democracy in Africa 
African transition into democracy, also considered part of the "third wave" were in 
the wake of what some Africanists considered the disappointment of liberation 











tangible results to Africans in general, save what Saul (2005: 257) refers to as "the 
very real achievement of overthrowing white minority rule". 
On the other hand scholars such as Chabal (2002: 456) claim that transitions in 
Africa in the 1990s were overwhelmingly as a result of pressure from IFls and donors 
for African states to implement certain political reforms; in most cases multi-party 
electoral democracy. He however does acknowledge the role played by discontented 
youth, movements within civil society which formed to challenge patrimonial states 
and calls for accountability and transparency in the state (Chabal, 2002: 457). 
Whereas Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 194) use many different factors to explain 
democratic experiments in Africa, their focus is on endogenous explanatory factors as 
opposed to exogenous or external factors. Their main focus is also to differentiate 
between the various causes and outcomes of African democratic projects. 
The literature on Africa's democratic experiments however conflates 
democratic transition and consolidation issues, the overarching conclusion being that 
there are arguably three consolidated democracies in the continent, Botswana, 
Mauritius and South Africa (Diamond, 1999: xi). The rest of the countries have either 
reverted back to authoritarian rule after initial transition, are classified as pseudo-
democracies, that is have not consolidated into a Western form of liberal democracy2, 
or have remained at the beginning of the transition phase not having progressed 
beyond the "electoral democracy" phase. 
Richard Sklar (1996: 5) cautions against considering this as evidence of the 
continent's failure to democratise and instead refers to it as "democracy in parts" 
because the meaning of democracy is "enriched by contributions from all cultures and 
nations. Classifications that distinguish country-wide systems by type as democratic, 
partially democratic, or less than democratic do not reveal the creative processes of 
democratic development", reveal the range of actors involved or acknowledge that 
2 Western liberal democracy refers to democracy crafted according to the cultural and institutional 
values of western society in which the freedoms of the individual citizen in relation to the state are 
heralded as being of primary importance. The term pseudo-democracy is used to explain systems of 
government that possess the external trappings of democracy, in the form perhaps of widely contested 












consolidation may be taking place. This paper is however concerned with democracy 
as a general concept. 
Chabal's argument that focuses on explaining the way in which notions of 
liberal democracy have been interpreted and commandeered by the African state to 
suit systems of neo-patrimonialism is preferred here (Chabal, 2002: 456). It follows 
the logic that African elites responded to calls to democratise by simply adapting 
liberal democratic tenets to fit patronage systems. He posits that the patronage system 
of governance that determines the use of political and economic power is recognised 
as such by not only the state and consequent "big men" who are the patrons, but is 
also known and supported by clients who stand to benefit, or not, from the system. As 
such the population or clients will participate in a multi-party electoral democracy to 
the extent that an alternative to an incumbent regime promises significant benefit from 
their patronage (Chabal, 2002:459). Incumbent patrons, who are aware of this then, 
simply co-opt into their party any possible opposition, especially those that might 
pose a genuine threat to their tenure. "Winner-take-all elections" are not a viable 
option (Chabal, 2002: 460). 
The literature is characterised by a sort of holding of breath in anticipation of 
many of the pseudo-democracies reverting to authoritarian rule. An investigation of 
African democracies in comparison to Latin American and Eastern European ones 
would reveal reversions to authoritarian rule and a seeming hanging in the balance of 
many states can be interpreted as part of the trajectory of African democratising 
processes (Lipset, 1994: 5). This is in opposition to outright failure or the way 
democratisation is imagined failed because of Western liberal democracy's ignoring 
"historical and socio-political continuities" of the continent; continuities between pre, 
colonial and post-colonial eras (Chabal, 2002: 452). Looking closely at these reveals 
that entities external to the continent have not changed their manner of interaction 
with the continent. Power is still defined and used in the same manner; a manner that 
extracts from the continent and fixes inequalities while also stipulating what is best 
for Africa (Chabal, 2002: 451). Claude Ake (1991: 41) notes that "the IMF and the 











2.2.3 Notions of "Good Governance" and Development 
Good governance is understood by many in the creditor community as something that 
combines efficient (accomplishing tasks in the best and least costly way possible) and 
effective (doing the right things that citizens want done) service delivery while 
ensunng that "political corruption" is avoided and curbed in these processes 
(Goldsmith, 2003: 186). Goldsmith critiques such an understanding of "good 
governance" by stating that it is not always possible to achieve all three ingredients 
simultaneously, in other words it would be possible to achieve results in an extremely 
cost effective manner, but yet consultation with relevant parties, is omitted. 
Furthermore good governance is now "closely linked to the consolidation of 
liberal democratic transitions" that have taken place. (Cotton and Ramachandran, 
2003: 215). "Good governance" is berated as a misplaced and unnecessary moral 
judgement on recipient governments that emphasises uneven global political power 
relationships (Shivji, 2004: 3). Neo-liberalism and hence liberal notions of democracy 
do not take into account conceptions of power in governance and as such lock the 
discourse into a "moral paradigm" enabling those with power to manipulate those 
without. 
The ability of IFIs to deem governance structures or systems of African states 
as 'good', 'bad' or 'evil' or to insist on good governance takes sovereignty away from 
states. Focus is removed from effective governance and systems that enable the 
people to be agents of change (Shivji, 2004: 3). No consideration is given to their 
efforts and they are seen as democracy being done to them and not by or for them. An 
alternative view of 'good governance' is therefore one that sees such political 
conditionalities as new avowals of imperial manipulation and control (Shivji, 2004: 
5). 
2.2.3.1 Liberal democracy as good governance? 
As with neo-liberalism and its suitability for holistically informing a developmental 
agenda, it is necessary to question democracy, more specifically in its Western liberal 











confined to a decision or outcome in terms of governance choices or structures but 
rather, the manner in which democracy and development then interact as distinct but 
inseparable processes. Moreover, by IFIs and creditor agencies insisting on good 
governance for financial assistance, development and democracy become twin 
processes (Akokpari, 2006: 6). 
Many Africanists have commented on the inapt make-up of electoral 
democracy for the continent. As previously mentioned one reason is the failure to 
achieve a change of regime or elites and then revert to co-option of the opposition. A 
second reason is that where co-option and peaceful sharing amongst elites of state 
resources has not worked, conflict and competition over said resources and perhaps 
external aid results (Chabal, 2002: 450). Thus it is evidenced that elections or 
systems that do not change the understanding of processes, in and of themselves, do 
not lead to democracy and certainly not development. Chabal's (2002: 451) comment 
encapsulates this: "[ e ]lections, the measure of Western polities, have become in 
Africa one of the many instruments of factional mobilisation". In addition to conflict 
over resources, they also mobilise and exacerbate people along ethnic lines. The 
benefits then of any successes in development and economic growth only accrue to a 
chosen few, or those who are part of a certain faction. 
Such a debate frequently leads to a discussion on institutions and the need for 
vibrant and robust ones in order for democracy to be called consolidated or viable. 
The nativity of such institutions is determined by the existence of an equally vibrant 
and independent civil society, politically wily and autonomous from the state (Chabal, 
2002: 461). However, the formation of the type of institutions envisioned by 
ahistorical and asocial western liberal democracy is not possible (Shivji, 2004: 3). 
Africa has not yet, but has to, nurture institutions that re-imagine democracy and 
governance in terms of four features: the African individual (within community), the 
African state, African civil society and the neo-patrimonial system, however 
transformed and mutated by liberal democracy and liberal economics. 
Though variations exist amongst African states, generalisations can be made 
based on shared histories of colonialism, SAPs and so forth. Firstly, the African 











in the community. Such behaviour is therefore outside the formal legal or legal 
rational constitutional order. Secondly, the state in the continent is certainly not 
differentiated from society because of patronage systems that maintain the ties of 
elites to particular social groupings and communities. Thirdly these continued patron-
client relationships govern the behaviour of elites who have simply become more 
adept at concealing overt exchanges in the liberal democratic compliant institutions 
they operate within (Chabal, 2002: 452). Lastly, the so-called bastion of hope for 
Africa's democratisation, civil society, is not self-standing. Because of neo-
patrimonialism, even those who work within civil society maintain and rely on 
vertical links with people in their communities and those in government. There do not 
exist as there does in the West, horizontal relationships along professional or 
functional lines (Chabal, 2002: 452). 
It remains to be said liberal democracy is not necessarily good governance; not 
for the continent at least. Therefore, an African conception and or version of 
democracy must be developed. Saul (2005), Ake (1994) and others all call for a 
'social democracy' in the continent, which includes and is propelled by the majority 
and also considers their concerns of paramount importance. In such a social 
democracy, the people determine the elites that represent them and those that do not. 
With such a view, one begins to question more closely Thabo Mbeki's standpoint that 
the people of Zimbabwe will ultimately decide who they want in power. Perhaps it is 
for his critics to realise that the call Mbeki makes is not simply for 'free and fair' 
elections, but rather for Western powers to allow the self-determination of African 
peoples. If the people of Zimbabwe continue to vote the ZANU-PF regime into 
power, it is necessary to ponder the underlying structural causes that continue to make 
this so. 
2.2.3.2 Good governance as a precondition of development 
If 'good governance' is to be interpreted as donor funded Western liberal democracy 
then it is with a degree of certainty it can be said that good governance does not 
necessarily induce development. Good governance has to emerge from within African 
systems of governance and not be solely externally driven or owned. Ake (1991: 40) 











governments have been systematically "underdeveloping" their countries. He posits 
that as long as democracy or good governance is a prerequisite for funding, it will 
lead to underdevelopment or further marginalisation, through the "democratisation of 
disempowerment" (Ake, 1994: 8). 
Democracy in Africa cannot lead to development because of the neo-
patrimonial system and the relationships that the ordinary African person has with the 
state. So, even though the state may have access to resources for purposes of 
development, the multi-party electoral systems simply serve to heighten electoral 
competition over state power (Ake, 1994: 8). In such elections, Africans are only 
faced with a choice between various oppressors; thus voting for disempowerment. 
This issue of disempowerment is at multiple levels. As Ake explains, unless the 
systems of governance are changed, there can be no true democracy; the African is 
already disempowered. On a second level, the African is disempowered because of 
the lack of choice over economic policies. At this level, though democracy, 
consultation, transparency and accountability are touted by IFIs, the forums where 
austerity measures are discussed do not allow for vocal ising public opinion. In fact, 
political leaders are urged to "muster the political will" to achieve the aims of SAP 
(Ake, 1994: 17). Essentially, being encouraged to use any means necessary, however 
painful, to achieve the desired end. 
It is difficult to consider the end of the spectrum that would say democracy, in 
its Western liberal form, can lead to development; this of course being the IFI 
position. Akokpari (2006: 911 0) in his comparison of various developmental states 
notes that the version of development alongside democracy was unique to Western 
Europe, with one reason being the extended time over which both democracy and 
industrialisation took place. Secondly, the Asian developmental states have only 
recently begun to democratise, but have otherwise been dictatorial, authoritarian or 
semi-authoritarian states. The economic upliftment of the middle classes especially 
has led for new calls for political freedoms and less state involvement (Akokpari 
2006: 11). 
The success of the Asian developmental state however does not mean that this 











with approval from creditors, ignored democracy for the sake of development. As 
opposed to Asian states where democracy was not considered a possibility, African 
states were faced with this form of governance as a highly recommended option. 
Elites were however, able to circumvent this option by using the logic that democracy 
and the state resources that would have to be put towards fostering it, funding 
opposition parties and campaigns, would all "inhibit development". Hence given that 
development and empowering the people had been the basis of struggles for 
independence, this would be the most important issue on the post-colonial agenda. 
2.2.4 Democracy and Economic Reform (SAPs) 
2.2.4.1 Economic Development and Democratisation 
While SAPs have evolved into alternative development structures such as PRSPs and 
the like, it is necessary to assess the contribution of economic reforms and adjustment 
in weakening democracy or concealing political openings. As noted earlier, the nature 
of African democracies is questionable. Nonetheless what is of importance is that the 
minimal standards required to identify a democracy, multi-party elections, are 
prevalent. 
Comparativists Rose and Shin (2001: 331), Huntington (1975) and van de 
Walle (1997: 15) all discuss the importance of economic stability or developing "the 
institutions of a modem market economy" (Rose & Shin, 2001: 337). Given that 
Africa is already behind both in terms of development and democracy it begs the 
question should modernisation of institutions (economic or market reforms) be 
prioritised above political freedoms? Van de Walle (1997: 17) in his emphasis on 
"minimal economic stabilisation" to strengthen African democracies does not 
advocate stabilisation dependent on IFI dictated policies but rather "basic 
macroeconomic stabilisation" and a "semblance of fiscal balance". Of salience here 
is economic development's necessity for democracy; the question is whether it should 











2.2.4.2 Politics and Structural Adjustment 
As already determined, reforms are not confined to the economic realm but also to the 
political. Again, this is because of the patron-client relationships and political power 
dynamics that exist on the continent (Herbst, 1990: 949). This paper makes inference 
that IFIs in implementing SAPs failed to acknowledge this phenomenon and respond 
to it appropriately, and where they did, it was simply to slap on 'good governance' as 
a requirement and condition for loans. In other words there has been serious failure to 
comprehend the nature of African polities. 
We refer to Herbst (1990: 950) to re-iterate the very real existence of neo-
patrimonialism as the lens through which politics is seen and the basis of systems that 
govern politics. This particularly affects African politics because SAPs demand 
economic austerity from African governments requiring them to limit or cease from 
intervening in the economy. However, the experience of African governments in 
Sudan, Ghana, Nigeria and least of all Zimbabwe, to name a few, have been to illicit 
protest and demonstration by those of the population who are affected and are able to 
voice their disgruntlement (Ibhawoh, 1999: 160). In such instances, the systems of 
multi-party electoral democracy as well as the harsh economic reforms, threaten the 
tenure of incumbent regimes (Herbst, 1990: 951). 
Faced with such threats, incumbent regimes respond to protesting citizens with 
repressive measures of varying degrees of severity. Such measures range from 
banning of protest marches and strike action, unleashing of security forces at protest 
events, harassment of opposition parties, especially those using the effects of SAPs as 
a platform for campaign and removing freedoms from the press and media. 
Essentially these threats on incumbents' tenure emphasise the effectiveness of 
patronage systems for elites. Economic reforms cannot threaten patronage systems 
over much. If they do, African governments will simply abandon them in some sort of 
effort to restore some benefits to the majority of the population (Akonor, 2006: 5). 
A major shortcoming of SAPs, as we see in Zimbabwe, is that the poor people 
are the ones that suffered the most, further entrenching poverty into society 











Zimbabwe only abandoned ESAP when their tenure was threatened internally 
(Mumvuma et aI, 2006: 260). Abandoning SAPs results in reversals of IFI and 
creditor sponsored financial commitments amidst an environment of prevailing 
poverty and externally approved - albeit benignly - repressive measures. Upon 
abandonment, states continue with repressive measures so as to achieve their aims; 
repression or anti-democratic measures which severely limit "the individual's ability 
to participate in political activities" are thus a result of SAPs (Ndulo, 2003: 367). 
One can thus conclude that democratisation or politicalliberalisation is not the 
aim of SAP or economic reform. Creditors and IFIs are simply concerned with 
continuity of economic reform programmes and their projected outcomes despite 
democracy being undermined in the process (van de Walle, 1999: 30). Although we 
have concluded above that Africa needs to develop and democratise simultaneously, it 
is clear that in democratically evolving states, economic reforms implemented with 
little deliberation can severely impact on the ability to capitalise on political opening. 
Unless a viable system of government, and in Africa, one that sees the majority of 
peoples as important, reform and democracy cannot go hand in hand (van de Walle, 
1999: 38). As long as adjustment represents development, the nature of political 
authority, weak capacity or perhaps reluctance of governments', and the relationships 
of states to international donors, will see the twin processes fail. 













CASE STUDY - ZIMBABWE 
3.1.1 'Njambanja' - Crisis in Zimbabwe 
'Njambanja', meamng chaos, disorder or general mess and mayhem, is the tenn 
commonly used amongst Zimbabweans to refer to the current situation in the country. 
Economically Zimbabwe has been in unconcealed decline since 1999 experiencing an 
overall decline in GDP of about 30% and currently standing at -5.7% (World 
Economic Outlook, 2007). Presently, the fonnerly thriving agricultural sector has 
experienced severe setbacks, both from natural and human induced causes. As such, 
agricultural exports that used to sustain the economy have declined. Manufacturing 
and industrial production have also declined and again exports are affected. 
Unemployment levels are extremely high at 80%, and where there are jobs 
available, salaries cover the bare minimum of daily expenses for an average family 
(Aid agencies contemplate, 2007). Most importantly, the 'black' or parallel market 
has unofficially taken over from the Zimbabwe Reserve Bank (ZRB) as the 
detenniner of inflation and foreign currency rates (Kanyenze, 2003: 9). Because there 
are no exports to generate foreign reserves, exporters would rather trade their little 
'forex' earnings on the black market for a higher rate. In mid 2007, official rates were 
ZWD 250: USD 1 and approximately ZWD 250,000: USD 1 on the parallel market 
(How to stay alive, 2007). Inflation rates stood at 3,700% officially and unofficial 
estimates in August 2007 place it in the region of 13,000% (Munoz, 2007: 4). This 
has forced inflation and prices of general goods to soar. Currently official inflation is 
estimated at about 5000 percent whereas unofficial estimates put it in the region of 13 
000 percent. This parallel market is not confined to monetary issues, it extends to 
general goods and commodities; anything can be traded and found on the black 











which is virtually unavailable through nonnal channels of petrol stations (Aid 
agencies contemplate, 2007). 
Zimbabwe is also in political crisis. Firstly, the rule of law has failed. There 
are claims that state security agents and judicial servants do not uphold the law and 
justice is not served (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2007: 9). Secondly, the government has 
implemented authoritarian and repressive measures against the population through 
limiting the right to meet in large groups and limits on press freedoms (Brett, 2004). 
Thirdly, is the supposed intimidation by ruling party youth militia of opposition MDC 
members attests to the fact that political freedoms have been garnished and that 
freedom of choice has been taken away from citizens (Raftopoulos et aI, 2006: 12). 
Hence, given the topical nature of Zimbabwe's crisis, it is necessary to outline some 
of its explanations. 
3.1.1.1 Explanations of the Crisis 
Though referring to three similar explanations of Zimbabwe's crisis, an attempt will 
be made to underline the nuances that differentiate them. It is argued that the ruling 
ZANU-PF regime as self-styled custodians of the state turned it into an authoritarian 
entity (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 101). This authoritarian state, ruling by repression and 
violence, has held onto the reins of power and emerged as the single and most 
legitimate representative of the state (Raftopoulos, 2004: xiii). The state has also been 
able to maintain its authority and hold on power through neo-patrimonialism and 
corruption. The control of resources, most especially land, is an example of this (Saul, 
2005: 140). This linkages of the crisis to an authoritarian, patron-like and therefore 
corrupt state, suggests insincerity on the state's part with regard the populations needs 
and development in general. 
Zimbabwe has also been projected as a failed or a very weak state (Brett, 
2006: 9). The argument presupposes that the regime is no longer able to administer 
the state and oversee the running of the country efficiently or effectively (IMF Report, 
2007: 1). According to this explanation the state is characterised as corrupt and 
patrimonial. The fundamental difference between the two explanations rests on the 











interests of elites, remains able to administer and run the state, even if in ways that are 
disapproved of by bystanders. The failed state on the other hand is unable to sustain 
itself and eventually will collapse resulting in private entities controlling service 
delivery (Rotberg, 2003: 5/6). 
The third explanation for crisis is the personalised and dictatorial rule of 
President Robert Mugabe who is allegedly obsessed with being in power (Meredith, 
2002: 123). Having appropriated patriotic history to present himself as the most 
legitimate liberator of the nation from the clutches of colonialism and thus as the only 
alternative for the nation, Mugabe has taken a hold of power and built the ruling 
party, regime, state institutions and nation around himself (Raftopoulos, 2004: xiii). 
Such a creation of the nation as his personal fiefdom has led to crisis, as it is 
unsustainable. Such personal rule has not allowed for the interests, needs and 
concerns of ordinary citizens to be taken into consideration. 
3.1.1.2 Thesis explanation 
Although the Zimbabwe crisis can be understood from varying standpoints, the study 
hypothesises that the IFI instituted ESAP regime greatly contributed towards 
manifesting the crisis. In particular ESAP hampered Zimbabwe's democracy because 
of the adverse effects of economic reform and the contradictory nature of economic 
and political liberalisation. In addition, neo-liberal economic reform was an ill 
thought out, ill suited and non-consultative development agenda for the country. As 
such this paper, albeit acknowledging the validity of some of the above claims, posits 
that a plausible explanation of the current political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe 
lies in the adoption and implementation of ESAP. By extrapolation therefore, part of 
the explanation for the current crisis lies in the rigidly dependent and one-sided 
relationships dictated by the global political economy. Though the domestic 
explanations of Zimbabwe's crisis are valid, in searching for a solution to the 
situation, a solution based on economic development and democratisation of a sort, 
the external international explanation is important. 
Thus Zimbabwe's cnSIS IS informed by a failure by external factors to 











covert encouragement of establishing a de-facto one party state, mIssmg the 
opportunity to support the gap inadvertently by the move to a one-party state and the 
dependent relationship on western states in the form of IFIs for economic and 
development assistance. As such it is necessary to briefly understand the historical 
foundations of the land issue, the one-party state and opposition politics as well as 
external relations as outlined in the following section. 
3.1.2 Zimbabwe's land issue 
3.1.2.1 Land - a site of struggle 
Issues of land ownership, relating to agriculture and subsistence farming present a 
focal point for Zimbabwe's history and provide a basis for explanation for the current 
political and economic crisis. Modem Zimbabwe was formed after 1890 when Cecil 
John Rhodes, Prime Minister of the British Cape Colony "sent whites to settle north 
of the Limpopo River" (Europa World, 2006). The land was the most valuable 
resource the settlers found and large areas of it were seized from the indigenous 
Shona and Ndebele occupants. This resulted in large amounts of land being controlled 
by a minority, under the name Southern Rhodesia. 
In 1962 the Rhodesian Front (RF) was formed and demanded full 
independence from the United Kingdom. This ushered in a period of time referred to 
as the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) years. During this time, the 
white minority government headed by Ian Smith, entrenched the system of 
landownership that saw white Rhodesians own large tracts of arable land and blacks 
relegated to small, overcrowded communal areas that were difficult to cultivate 
(Moyo, 2002: 1). Because this group of people were dependent on land for survival, it 
meant that they could only farm the land for subsistence, while white farmers used 
their land to create and accumulate wealth. 
Though the labour union based nationalist movements for independence had 
begun to agitate for change in the 1940s, land was an integral part of the full-fledged 











were thus co-opted into the struggle and encouraged to fight on the basis that they 
would own land and grow wealthy from it as a result. 
In 1979 the Lancaster House Agreement that formalised Zimbabwe as an 
independent state was signed. At these negotiations, a peace settlement was reached 
and an agreement regarding the running of the country established. Zimbabwe African 
National Union (ZANU) and Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) 
representatives vehemently opposed the terms of negotiation, while moderates like 
Abel Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole were more amenable to them; especially the 
concessions given to white farmers to remain on their land (Chikuhwa, 2004: 247). 
The agreement entailed that the incumbent British government would provide funds 
for the new Zimbabwean government to purchase land from white landowners after a 
period often to fifteen years, on a willing buyer willing seller basis (Moyo, 2002: 4). 
Consequently, the Smith regime's constitution remained intact except for changing 
the name Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. This constitution preserved political and, more 
importantly economic power, for the white minority by protecting their property 
rights and monopoly in business (Chikuhwa, 2004: 34). 
Since signing the Lancaster House Agreement it took almost twenty years for 
any genuine moves towards land redistribution. Moreover, the volatile way in which 
the issue came to the fore towards the close of 1998 as a national agenda makes it a 
very important issue in the discussion of Zimbabwe's developmental and democratic 
experiments (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 112). The land in Zimbabwe is a site of struggle 
for both development and democracy because any external assistance for the former 
needs to consider the legacies of racialised land policies (Moore, 2001: 164). In the 
case of the latter, recognition that though land was fought for, rural populations need 
to begin to participate more in decisions taken concerning what will be done with the 
resource and how it will be distributed is needed. 
3.1.2.2 Legacy of racialised land policy 
Though the liberation struggle resulted in political independence and a black majority 
government, the racialised land policies of the colonial settler state set in place a 











independence until the start of the new millennium, Zimbabwe was considered the 
breadbasket of Africa and as travelling a different development path in relation to 
other post-colonial African states (Mills, 2007). However, because of the continued 
presence of the white landowner minority an unequal economic system, that benefited 
the white minority and new black elite persisted (Meredith, 2002: 120). So, though the 
country appeared to flourish, especially after independence, the supposed wealth did 
not translate into anything tangible for the majority of Zimbabweans living in in-
arable rural areas. Thus one legacy of the racialised land policies is the continued 
poverty and unequal wealth system that kept the poor, poor (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2006: 
17). 
A second legacy is the paradoxical division between rural and urban 
populations. A black migrant population developed in Zimbabwe owing to the need 
for labour in the urban areas but at the same time because of segregation policies as 
well as an attachment to the land, many people maintained rural homes or very strong 
ties to rural areas (Moyo, 2002: 13). The division is paradoxical because, as in many 
African countries, on the one hand there are people living in urban areas whose 
livelihoods are not dependent on the land. Yet, these same people have relatives, 
perhaps a spouse, child or parent, residing in the rural areas. 
This has had vital implications for political support bases evidenced by the 
way in which the current regime has dealt with a population that has both urban and 
rural ties. A black middle class that has increasingly limited connections with rural 
Zimbabwe with each passing generation has emerged in the country (Moyo & Yeros, 
2007: 113). In fact, this class existed even during the struggle for liberation and 
because the struggle was largely fought on the basis of owning land, the place of the 
black middle class in relation to a ruling regime that won independence on the above 
premise becomes questionable. It is therefore argued, that if the ruling regime does 
not view the middle classes as important most development oriented policies and 
programmes will be directed at the rural population, especially given that the 











The current diverse relations between urban and rural have enabled the state to 
maintain patron-client relationships. Ake (1994) and Chabal (2002) concur with the 
above assertion and would argue that by concentrating on the rural peasantry as its 
main support base, ZANU-PF is merely maintaining patronage relationships essential 
to preserve their tenure. As previously stated, Zimbabwe inherited a skewed economy 
after the Lancaster House agreement. This economy entrenched white minority 
benefit as well as that of a few black elites (Moyo, 2002: 7). The black majority was 
therefore confined to either being rural peasant farmers, or factory, farm or mine 
workers. Though some of the black middle class managed to take advantage of the 
change in regime and the seemingly new opportunities, these were a minority (Moyo, 
2002: 7). Other individuals of colour who benefited were part of the inner circle of the 
ruling party or had been a part ofthe system during Ian Smith's rule. 
The importance of the rural urban divide is related to the next section on 
opposition politics. A note to be made here is that the rural urban divide as a legacy of 
racialised land policy, has implications for democracy's evolution. The difficulty 
faced by opposition parties - especially one like the MDC that has posed such a threat 
to ZANU-PF - in penetrating rural constituencies, raises questions concerning 
democracy's transformation. 
3.1.3 The One Party State and Opposition Politics 
Focus on the above helps to explain ZANU's approach to challenges to its power. 
Soon after independence the majority ZANU party began to institute repressive 
measures against the ZAPU faction of government. ZAPU leadership and ex-
combatants were accused of treasonous acts and plotting to overthrow the ruling 
ZANU government (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 115). A period of violence using the 
North Korean trained "Fifth Brigade" begun to exterminate any untold threat to the 
regime and many rural dwellers in Matabeleland and the West of the country were 
tortured and massacred (Sanders, Cousins and Moore, 2007). The result was 
widespread fear of the ruling regime, untold death and suffering of the population in 











charges. The overall outcome was a merger of the two parties into a defacto one-party 
state committed to a "Marxist-Leninist doctrine" (Saul, 2005: 134). 
This co-option of the biggest opposition movement served to consolidate 
ZANU's power and was accompanied by absorbing all civil society movements 
including student's unions, labour unions - Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) - and other associations into the ranks of the ruling regime (Saul, 2005: 134). 
Funding as well as leadership and membership for the organisations was ascertained 
through the party and thus the state; there was no separation between the state and the 
ruling party. Since ZAPU's absorption and before the birth ofMDC, Zimbabwe Unity 
Movement (ZUM) came close to being a semi-serious threat to the state. 
Saul (2005: 135) states that though the move to a one-party state was intended 
to eliminate opposition to ZANU, their focus on regime generated civil society groups 
and their supporters meant that some space was opened for political debate; the press 
was also subject to more freedoms. As such in the late 1980s and early 1990s political 
debate intensified as students and workers were increasingly disgruntled with 
increased levels of poverty and unemployment; in addition, ESAP was being 
proposed and then implemented in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
With the advent of ESAP, the ZCTU, closely aligned to ZANU-PF, broke 
away from the relationship and began to agitate for changes. The adjustment 
programme was not working in their favour and they began to demand reversals in the 
efforts and a return to a people focused economic agenda (Chakaodza, 1993: 65). 
They were joined in their protests by university students and at times joined the 
separate protests and strikes of civil servants; though civil servants engaged in strike 
action, they were never openly part of anti-government activity (Chakaodza, 1993: 
65). The action by civics, students and the unions was summarily thwarted by the 
authorities and thus began a rift between the ZCTU and ZANU-PF. It is from this rift 
that Morgan Tsvangirai, then leader of the union movement in partnership with other 
opposition groups, initiated the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC); since its 
inception it has enjoyed mostly urban support and some support from non-traditional 











The crash of the Zimbabwe dollar in 1998 as well as the invasion of white 
farms by self-styled war veterans, gave the MDC the momentum it needed as 
threatening opposition to the ruling ZANU-PF (Bush & Szeftel, 2002: 7). Having 
derailed plans by the regime to implement a new constitution that awarded Mugabe a 
longer presidential term and allowed the government to seize land from white 
farmers, the MDC rose to prominence in the eyes of white farmers, the white minority 
and local and international business owners. The West, who had begun to show their 
disdain for Mugabe and the ruling ZANU-PF, also accepted the MDC as a viable 
alternative for Zimbabwe. When the MDC won almost 50 percent of seats in 
parliamentary elections in 2002, there was widespread hope that ZANU-PF and their 
land redistribution plans would be curtailed. Alas, other dynamics at play did not lead 
to this desired outcome (Lloyd, 2002: 224). 
It is argued that the institution of a one-party state in the late 1980s though 
thwarting opposition on one hand, allowed for the opening up of political space and 
civil liberties on the other. The protest of civics, students and unionists bears 
testament to the fact that a new moment for democracy in Zimbabwe was emerging. 
Unfortunately, the insistence of IFls for the state to implement ESAP at whatever 
cost, that is, repressive measures against agitators, meant that the window of 
opportunity for change was closed. Development was therefore being pursued at the 
expense of democracy. 
3.1.4 External Relations 
As with many other African countries, Zimbabwe is locked into intimate engagement 
with her former colonial master, the United Kingdom, while interacting with many 
others on the basis of financial and developmental assistance. Ties with Britain and 
the United States go back to the end of UDI and the beginning of independence at the 
Lancaster House negotiations in 1979. Though satisfactory, relations with western 
states were dependent and uneven. They were also constantly tested by the 
Zimbabwean government calls on the British to honour their promise to compensate 
and provide financing for the purchase of white owned land (Moyo, 2002: 8). These 











was a new British labour government in office, the agreement was reneged upon 
(Moyo, 2002: 8). 
While Zimbabwe maintained close ties, however tenuous, with the British 
government throughout the 1980s, the government was forced to limit its association 
with former communist counterparts in the East (Saul, 2005: 135). Nonetheless, given 
the recent heightened tensions with the west the government has in the recent past 
increased relations with China, Malaysia, Cuba and the Soviet Union. These 
relationships have meant that while it is ostracised by the west, Zimbabwe still has 
alternative avenues for assistance. 
Lastly, Zimbabwe's relationships with IFIs largely represent the desires and 
interests of their major shareholders. The relations between the country and these 
groups can be described as tenuous (lMF Staff Report, 2007: 5). Though Zimbabwe 
enjoyed favoured nation status in return for leaning away from Communism post Cold 
War, global recession changed the country's relationship with IFIs; to re-iterate 
Communism was no longer a threat and the West was no longer interested in 
placating semi-authoritarian states (Saul, 2005: 138). The following section describes 
these relationships thorough a discussion on ESAP. 
3.2 Economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP) 
3.2.1 Zimbabwe's Economic Context 
Prior to officially implementing ESAP in 1991, Zimbabwe which had been a member 
of the World Bank and IMF since independence in 1980, devalued the Zimbabwe 
dollar by about 23% as a pre-condition for a loan (Chakaodza, 1993: 48). Though the 
post-independence economy performed well initially, the country's economy had 
experienced a fall in foreign reserves that had necessitated this borrowing. In March 
of 1983, the IMF granted Zimbabwe a loan (Chakaodza, 1993: 49). This loan and 
others to follow during the remainder of the 1980s firmly established Zimbabwe in 
the Bretton Woods Washington Consensus system and formed the foundation of her 











3.2.2 Adopting ESAP 
3.2.2.1 Domestic Politics of Adopting ESAP 
Most critics of SAPs in Africa emphasise the lack of alternatives faced by adjusting 
governments at the time of implementing reforms. In Zimbabwe's case, the looming 
economic crisis characterised by high levels of foreign debt and exacerbated by 
drought meant that the government had to respond. Their response though based on 
many variables was primarily determined by external pressure to adhere to Western 
style neo-liberal economic policies. Other African states were doing or had done the 
same. By adopting the reforms they were able to cushion the blow, to some extent, of 
economic crisis. The important question here however is why the ruling elite, a 
government born out of a socialist type of guerrilla war, championing the merits of 
socialism, would abandon such a path to pursue capitalist and neo-liberal policies. 
Mumvuma et al (2006: 237) suggest that reforms were very seriously 
considered by the ruling elite because of the threat of loss to their post independence 
positions and profits, in other words a change of the rules of the game because of 
economic downturn. This would, to an extent, explain the seeming contradiction of a 
radical shift in ideology, as well as the fact that the ruling elite also attributed the 
seeming change in ideology to external pressure as "the ruling ZANU-PF did not 
want to accept that there had been an ideological shift, as they argued that whatever 
policy reforms they were introducing were being forced on them by external forces 
given the crisis they were in" (Mumvuma et aI, 2006: 241). 
This debate around an ideological shift came to the fore especially because it 
was clear that there was major opposition to the notion of policy reform, especially 
from civil society and economically marginalised groups of Zimbabwean society; 
there was concern that the state had departed from the proclaimed path of socialism. 
In order to allay the fears of some members of society and those devoted to socialism, 
the ruling elite also stated that the reforms were temporary and should not be seen as a 











key positions III tertiary institutions and cabinet III order to see reform through 
(Mumvuma et aI, 2006: 242). 
Although there is some truth to the above claim, within reforming 
administrations there are always those Western trained individuals and experts in 
financial and economic ministries who are more than partial to the gospel of neo-
liberal economics (Eyoh & Sandbrook, 2001: 8). Bernard Chidzero, Minister of 
Finance, was one such individual in the Zimbabwe government. His training and work 
experience in the West, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and close links to the IMF and World Bank Institutions explains his 
support for the reform packages (Bernard Chidzero). 
Not having fought in the liberation struggle, he was viewed with suspicion by 
stoic socialist members of the party and as being an agent of the West "in some 
circles, the minister was seen as representing the World Bank and the IMF" 
(Mumvuma et aI, 2006: 241). Chidzero was ultimately able to gain consensus or a 
semblance of it, in the party and this reveals that key players within ZANU circles had 
begun to see their interests diverge from the status quo and began to support policy 
reforms for whatever reasons (Mumvuma et aI, 2006: 240). Added to which, 
opposition party ZUM had won a significant number of seats in parliamentary 
elections and threatened to affect the newly formed one-party state. 
It has already been stated that the labour movements and other civics protested 
at the adoption of ESAP. It must be noted however, that initially the ZCTU had been 
in favour of reforms despite the fact that reforms would hit their members the hardest 
(Mumvuma et aI, 2006: 240). The reason for this has already been explained in the 
previous section, that by instituting a one-party state, the regime controlled all 
associations and groupings of a political nature, or ones that could pose a political 
threat (Saul, 2005: 135). 
3.2.2.2 International Politics of adopting ESAP 
This issue of labour movements and weakening or silencing of civil society to the 











consulted and so enabled the regime to unilaterally implement ESAP raises questions 
that point to the motives and role of external actors. Though Mumvuma et al (2006: 
242/3) strongly favour an argument for adoption of neo-liberal reforms as internally 
triggered, it is necessary to consider why issues such as consultation by civil society 
organisations were not considered. Furthermore, in view of the fact that Zimbabwe as 
an African late reformer, along with Burundi and Tanzania, were required to 
incorporate "institutional and democratic" reform into their SAPs, it becomes evident 
that the decision and momentum to implement ESAP came to a large extent from 
outside the country. 
This lack of consultation led to the implementation of ESAP in an 
environment where freedom of speech and other indices of good governance did not 
exist. The ruling ZANU elite were then able to continue and establish a system of 
governance upon this precedent. Again, it could be said that a crucial moment where 
Zimbabwe's democratisation trajectory could have been directed towards more 
openness, was missed. What is very important is the fact that the West, in the form of 
IFIs and other creditors, most especially the World Bank and the IMF colluded with 
the government to by-pass and ignore any democratic structures in order to ensure 
that ESAP was implemented at all costs. Indeed domestic explanations for deciding 
on ESAP exist, but whether these are more relevant than international ones simply 
obfuscates the view of pursuing development and democracy in the continent and the 
extent to which these processes are directed and dictated by outsiders. 
3.2.3 Adjustment: ESAP 
3.2.3.1 ESAP Phase I (1991 to 1995) 
Although unveiled in different stages, ESAP essentially had two stages, the second of 
which was not completed. Phase 1 was characterised by general market reforms, 
monetary policy reforms amendments to labour laws and some initial cuts in fiscal 
spending (Mumvuma et aI, 2006: 245). Market reforms were primarily aimed at 
reducing protectionist measures in the Zimbabwean economy. This was done by 











Import Licence (OGIL)"; by the end of Phase 1 of ESAP OGIL had been replaced by 
an open import system, making it easy to import both input materials for production 
as well as finished products, mostly luxury goods (Mumvuma et aI, 2006: 245). 
Another area of protectionism was price controls, ESAP entailed price deregulation to 
allow market determination. The rise in prices that followed deregulation and removal 
of import tariffs was supposed to be countered by increases in exports by producers. If 
producers were able to import inputs freely they would produce more a globally 
competitive standard, as such there would be no need for "export incentives" or 
subsidies (Gibbon, 1995:11). 
In terms of monetary policy the two main reforms here were deregulation of 
interest rates and the exchange rate. As a result interest rates increased while 
exchange rates, now being determined by the market, also increased (Mumvuma et aI, 
2006: 245, Gibbon, 1995: 10). In addition protection of and restrictions to entrance 
into the "financial services and money markets" was reversed encouraging entrance of 
'hot' money into the economy. The increase in interest rates as well as floating the 
currency led to high inflation rates. 
A third aspect of Phase 1 reforms were amendments to labour laws that saw 
the elimination of a minimum wage, this scrapping of minimum wage was supposedly 
meant to facilitate and strengthen collective bargaining of all labourers and wage 
earners (Gibbon, 1995: 10). Again this would deregulate and reduce supply-side 
protection and allow for market determination of prices. Workers in the private sector 
however were not the only group of workers to be targeted by ESAP. The reforms 
aimed at adjusting fiscal policy to result in a complete and substantial reduction of 
public spending. The main targeted sections of fiscal spending were retrenchment of 
civil servants and cuts on housing, education and health, sectors in which tremendous 
progress had been made since independence (Gibbon, 1995: 11). 
3.2.3.2 ESAP Phase II (1996 - 2000) 
Despite the debated limited success of the first phase of ESAP government proceeded 
to roll out the second stage of ESAP. It was implemented under the auspices of an 











declared ESAP as "highly satisfactory" (Bond, 2001: 8). Despite some challenges that 
made achieving the desired outcome difficult - drought - the members of the Bank 
deemed the project's sustainability as likely (Bond, 2001: 8). 
Phase 2 of ESAP dealt chiefly with fiscal policy issues, the biggest of which 
was privatisation of state owned enterprises. Along with reducing protectionist 
measures, the Bretton Woods Institutions insisted on privatisation to deal with 
inefficiency and profit erosion (Herbst, 1990: 950). Though this condition of reform 
had been suggested for the first phase, the government had been reluctant to do so and 
hence managed to divert the issue. They were then persuaded to adopt partial 
commercialisation of public enterprises (Chakaodza, 1993: 63; Mumvuma et aI, 2006: 
255). This issue was significantly difficult to negotiate with the ZANU-PF led 
government because of the growing calls for indigenisation of the economy alongside 
market reforms. 
A second issue to mark Phase 2 of ESAP was the emergence of war veterans 
as a politically destabilising force with their demands for compensation and 
acknowledgement for liberation struggle involvement (Moyo, 2002: 5). Although this 
issue can be analysed as a result of or part of the impact of ESAP, it is a significant 
feature of Phase 2 as it highlights the tensions between patronage and relations with 
IFIs or donors. As such Mugabe's acquiescence was a contradiction to reform policy; 
awarding war veterans packages of Z$50 000 and monthly pensions of Z$2000 in 
direct opposition to fiscal austerity measures (Mumvuma, 2006: 258). In general, 
there was much detraction from ESAP objectives and very little of the implementation 
took place especially in Phase 2 and in 2001 President Mugabe announced that 
reforms were being terminated. 
3.2.4 Adjusting to Adjustment - Impact of Reforms 
3.2.4.1 Economic Impact 
The results of market reforms and monetary policy simultaneously were primarily 











resulted in the Zimbabwe dollar losing close to 70% of its value in comparison to the 
US dollar (Bond & Manyanya, 2002: 60). In conjunction with the poor performance 
of manufacturing and exports owing to unfair competition on world markets, 
production inputs became very costly and these costs were passed onto the consumer. 
F or example the cost of food increased by 516 % while medical care, transport and 
education went up by 300% (Dansereau, 2003: 181). The group that was most 
affected by these results were the poor, as Sachikonye (2002: 15) puts it the poor got 
poorer while the rich got richer. 
As already mentioned, inflation increased from an average of 13.4% in the 
1980 to 1990 period to 27.6% during 1991 to 1995. This was mirrored by soaring 
interest rates as a result of a more than 50% crash of the stock market (Bond & 
Manyanya, 2002: 60). The results were twofold. One was that local businesses found 
it difficult to obtain loans because of the heavy repayments and this meant that only 
those who were well connected were able to operate at high profits leading to 
monopolies in the market (Bond, 2001: 10). Another effect was on the Zimbabwean 
financial markets that were susceptible to 'hot money' being invested in the economy 
and then quickly withdrawn when large profits had been made. Owing to the lax laws 
introduced through ESAP, foreign investment with limited regulation meant such 
large amounts of liquidity flowed both in and out of the economy without any 
contribution to GDP (Dansereau, 2003: 181). In addition, because foreign exchange 
moved freely, those who did benefit from exports were able to keep money outside of 
the country and did not reinvest in the Zimbabwean economy; something ESAP was 
supposed to have guaranteed (Bond, 2001: 5). 
The effect of revised labour laws to do away with a minimum wage was 
retrenchment of large proportions of the labour force; this affected both the private 
and public sector (Sachikonye, 1995: 10911 0). Civil servants wages fell by 60% 
coupled with approximately 30 000 job losses. Overall unemployment rose from 35% 
to 45% as an additional effect of falling manufacturing (Dansereau, 2003: 181). In 
conjunction with cuts in fiscal spending in the areas of health, education and housing 
especially this meant that there was an increase of participants in the informal sector 
as well as a boost in basic entrepreneurs (Brand, Mupedziswa & Gumbo, 1995: 136). 











outskirts of major cities and towns as well as the setting up of markets in the cities 
and high density suburbs. 
Two interlinked impacts of ESAP are felt in the re-emergence of war veterans 
demanding compensation and the re-emergence of Land redistribution rhetoric. These 
features fall both within economic and political impacts of ESAP, economically 
because initially IFIs refused to acknowledge their existence as issues pertinent to 
development discourse in Zimbabwe; especially land redistribution (Moyo, 2002: 5). 
Thus when government decided to make the payouts to the 'war veterans' the IFIs 
reneged on ESAP loan agreements and put pressure on the state for repayment. In 
addition when the government began to make calls for land redistribution and began 
to enact the 1993 Land Designation Act, more loans did not materialise (Moyo, 2002: 
5/6). 
This highlights the gap between political motivations, not taken into 
consideration by IFIs and economic policy simply implemented. It also reveals the 
interesting tensions between rigid operations and policies of financial institutions and 
the fluidity of decision-making processes necessary for those in political office. 
Added to this is the nature of the terms that are a part of reforms and loans attached to 
them. These terms are characterised though intended to buffer the institution from 
poor economic and financial decisions by borrower governments simultaneously carry 
punitive measures for unfavourable political decisions to the governments represented 
by the IF Is shown in the IMF and World Bank's rapid reversal of loan agreements. 
Interestingly, Bond (2001: 6) suggests that fewer funds than were initially promised 
and agreed upon actually were given to the Zimbabwean government and further that 
it is still paying for ESAP today; because the programme was paid for by "mortgaging 
the future at a rate unparalleled in the country's history". 
The simultaneous payouts to 'war veterans', failure of loans from the Bank 
and the IMF as well increased military spending in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) alongside already increasing inflation, led to more inflation and a crash of the 
Zimbabwean dollar on what was called 'black Friday' in November 2007 (Bond, 
2007: 149). In response the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) pegged the currency to 











described below is the re-emergence of a parallel economy with floated currency rates 
and the formal system pegging the rate at artificial levels (Kanyenze, 2003: 4). 
It is evident that as a development agenda the neo-liberal economic reforms 
set out for Zimbabwe by the Bretton Woods system were incompatible with the 
state's overall aims. The greatest economic impact is the failure of the authors of 
ESAP to recognise the issue of indigenising the economy. As previously mentioned 
an aspect of the independence government's economic policy sidelined by ESAP was 
wealth creation as part of economic development. Though indigenisation and land 
redistribution have an undeniably political root, they are sites of struggle in 
Zimbabwe's development agenda (Moyo, 2002: 4). 
3.2.4.2 Political Impact 
Prior to ESAP's implementation, there had been disunity with government, ZANU-PF 
ranks, concerning pursuit of a neo-liberal path. Despite detractors successfully 
lobbying against Phase 2 of ESAP and causing its delay, eventually they were 
convinced of ESAP's merits. However, a split existed within the party and already 
existent factions became polarised into pro-reformers and anti-reformers (Mumvuma, 
2006:257). This split within the party was evident of a lack of consensus on a 
developmental agenda for Zimbabwe and resulted in even some MPs resigning 
because of their disagreement with policy and its effect on the population 
(Sachikonye, 1995: 54). 
The economic effects of reform outlined above affected the people in their 
daily survival. Consumers' purchasing power was significantly eroded alongside 
decreased access to public services (Brand et aI, 1995: 136). Civil society 
organisations challenged government on these eflects and because of pressure on 
government to implement ESAP, state-civil society relations collapsed (Mumvuma et 
aI, 2006: 260). Strikes by public servants as well as food riots and other 
demonstrations organised by the ZCTU were engaged in by many Zimbabweans in 
protest against the dissatisfaction with reform. The most affected groups were 
students, workers, black entrepreneurs and civil servants. These groups' involvement 











support away from or beginning to demonstrate their lack of support for the ruling 
elite (Bond, 2001: 14 - 16). 
In any political system it is expected that opposition political parties will 
challenge incumbent governments on unsatisfactory policies. Gibbon (1995: 11) 
however, points out a political impact of ESAP on Zimbabwe's democracy in that 
"the opposition parties which had emerged in the late 1980s, like those which had 
survived since 1980, were all firmly pro-economic liberalisation, and consequently 
suffered a partial loss of profile". Because opposition parties supported ESAP they 
were rendered incapable of campaigning around economic development issues and as 
such did not present a viable alternative to the ruling ZANU led government. 
Mumvuma et al (2006: 256) describe the political mobilisation of civil society, 
and by inference the passivity of existing opposition parties, as "a political crisis that 
undermined the legitimacy of the ruling elite to properly govern the country". The 
result of this was the losers of ESAP organising themselves in resistance against the 
negative policies (Mumvuma et aI, 2006: 254). Louder calls by these groups for an 
end to policy reforms were heard as well as general challenging of the political 
system, calls for the exposition of corrupt government officials and more transparency 
and accountability. Those defined by Mumvuma et al (2006: 254) as the losers of 
ESAP began to organise themselves in resistance against these negative policies. 
The ZCTU ostensibly led this resistance and together with other civics in 
1997/8, initiated a shift away from ZANU affiliation by mobilising students, urban 
workers and farm workers. In 1998/99 ZCTU and other civic organisations, most 
especially the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) organised a "Working 
People's Convention" in pursuit of 'broad-based movement for change' later giving 
birth to the opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC); part of 
these calls for change was the creation of a new constitution (Raftopoulos et aI, 2006: 
12). 
Lastly, the political impact of ESAP was in terms of land redistribution, 'war 
veterans' politics and indigenisation issues. Calls for black economic empowerment 











The exclusion from or the barriers to entrance into the economy revealed a section of 
ZANU-PF's potential and actual base, that had been neglected by ESAP. In order to 
recoup these support bases government pursued Black economic empowerment, 
coined 'Affirmative Action'. This merely served to exacerbate the racially skewed 
economic system, and contradicted ESAP as it served to destroy confidence of the 
minority white business population and foreign investors (Mumvuma et aI, 2006: 
256). As already stated, the 'war veterans' were compensated and so kept as a 
political support base while rural peasant farmers were co-opted by the revival of land 
redistribution rhetoric, all to show that the government was attempting to tread water 
and keep a balance between satisfying reform conditionalities and maintaining a client 
or support base. 
3.2.5 ESAP & Current Crisis 
3.2.5.1 Making the Links 
The genesis of Zimbabwe's crisis has been located in many different circumstances. 
As mentioned above many arguments point to Mugabe as the primary cause, other 
arguments point to the ZANU-PF regime and the persistence of patron-client politics 
in Zimbabwe and others still, blame it on the lack of the rule of law, corruption and 
lack of transparency that accompanies a patronage system. An argument favoured in 
this work is one posited by commentators such as Bond (2001: 3; 2007: 149) and 
Manyanya (2002: 15). The two locate Zimbabwe's current crisis, at least 
economically, in the colonial era or UDI phase of Rhodesia. They present a thread 
that runs through from the debt crisis faced by the Rhodesian government in the mid 
1970s, how it was inherited by the independence government at the beginning of the 
1980s, how they responded to the increasing external and internal debt through 
various loans yet trying to balance this all with forging ahead with a socialist plan. 
The crisis rooted in the economic fabric of the country continued to rear its 
ugly head towards the close of the decade and as already noted, the Zimbabwean 
ZANU-PF led government eventually agreed on neo-liberal economic reforms in the 
hopes of salvaging the economy, stabilising it and appeasing IFIs and other donors 











economic crises have contributed to the protracted and adverse economic crisis, neo-
liberal reforms in the form of Economic Structural Adjustment CESAP) particularly 
contribute to the current political crisis by way of eroding or redirecting the 
democracy's trajectory through its severely debilitating effects. 
3.2.5.2 ESAP and Zimbabwe's Democracy 
The current crisis is one that offers Zimbabweans no recourse to action politically and 
economically. High inflation rates, shortages of food, fuel and other basic 
commodities, lack of health care and other public goods have locked the majority of 
Zimbabweans into a paralysis of poverty. Politically, freedom of expression and the 
freedom to challenge the state through open and transparent structures have been 
rendered non-existent. 
Part of the rationale of this work is that ESAP provided opportune moments to 
transform the Zimbabwean political system in such a way that would allow for 
economic development to become a substantive reality. Protest against adjustment in 
the form of food riots, student marches and civil servant strikes ushered in what many 
gladly embraced as a new dawn in which democracy, or at least political freedoms, 
could be more recognised in Zimbabwe. It makes sense that the Zimbabwean 
government's response to protest and political expression was one of repression; this 
was, and continues to be, the norm of dealing with challenge (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2002: 
10114). As a regime criticised by many of its former supporters for not having 
delivered on independence promises, they resorted to varying tactics to maintain 
power and a semblance of authority over the population. So by whom and where was 
the opportunity missed to consolidate democracy? 
The opportunity was clearly missed by the vanous groups opposmg 
government both in the 1990s and after the government decided to depart from ESAP. 
These opposing groups - especially the ZCTU and the political party which grew out 
of it CMDC) and posed direct threats to the government - failed in that they could not 
forge a path that enunciated both a democratising and a developmental trajectory. An 
example of this is the 2000 constitutional referendum lost by ZANU-PF which 











(Raftopoulos et aI, 2006: 13; Chikuhwa, 2004: 86/7); this was another significant 
groove in the nation's history that could have been exploited to full benefit and helped 
to usher in a new dispensation had the MDC and other civics involved in crafting the 
document not been so rigid as to their desired outcomes (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 116). 
It can be argued that had a 'yes' vote been encouraged more political opening would 
have resulted in favour of opposition and Zimbabwean people centred democracy. 
Granted it is difficult to claim that the MDC has completely failed as they 
have been the most vocal and most threatening opposition party to ZANU-PF for a 
long time. However, the ZCTU and other civics failed because they were manipulated 
by the regime. The MDC failed because though it took hold of the new political 
moment, it aligned itself to a neo-liberal and western agenda. Bond and Manyanya 
(2002: xiv) note that the MDC's failure to articulate an economic developmental 
agenda commensurate with the founding of a labour movement meant they closed the 
door on political opening, or as they coin it an end to an "exhausted nationalism". 
More so, Mumvuma et al (2006: 262) note that the MDC in its inception and 
engagement with the state failed to alleviate or divert conflict with the state from their 
supporters. Instead, the significant challenge that the MDC and their supporters 
represented to the ruling elite resulted in "additional pressure on the political 
leadership to adopt more populist policies and repressive measures, despite their long-
term adverse consequences". 
The MDC has partners in failure in the IMF and World Bank and other 
donors. The claim has been firmly made that by compelling governments to 
implement SAPs, IFIs bypass any consultative processes thus bringing question to 
their commitment to democracy. In the case of Zimbabwe however, failure is twofold. 
Through IMF and World Bank's insistence to continue with harmful ESAP and the 
expectation of the Zimbabwe government to see the process through to the end, they 
turned a blind eye and even encouraged repressive anti-democratic behaviour by the 
regime (Brett, 2004). 
As such a firm foundation was set for repreSSIOn and anti-democratic 
behaviour. When the international community now speak out against it, the regime is 











insistence upon economic reforms (Sachikonye, 2002: 17). The ZANU-PF have thus 
firmly established themselves as the only way to achieving at least economic 
development and alleviation out of poverty for the Zimbabwean people, though they 
are failing to achieve this. It is not, however, to claim that the ZANU-PF is not a 
suitable regime to lead Zimbabwe, but rather to show that the MDC, widely touted by 
foreign media as the saviour of Zimbabwe, is an equally poor, if not worse alternative 
(Raftopoulos, 2006: 212). Their alliance with neo-liberalism and their choices to seek 
refuge and assistance in the West, without considering the majority of the 
Zimbabwean people and their needs, deems them thus. 
3.2.5.3 ESAP and the Current Crisis 
The cornucopIaS of economic and political problems in Zimbabwe have had far 
reaching effects on the social and moral fabric of society. Economically, in addition to 
recent hyper inflation and price controls, whose effects have been mentioned, it is 
necessary to highlight the parallel or black market. This informal economy is 
associated with high inflation rates and is informed by the shortage and hoarding of 
foreign currency (Brett, 2004). 
Though it experienced a surge during the ESAP years, there has been an even 
greater increase in its activity and a merger of some of these illegal activities with the 
informal sector. As such, any members of the Zimbabwean economy engaged in any 
form of business that generates foreign currency no longer have an incentive to keep 
these reserves in official and formal structures; this is not a situation unique to the 
current crisis but rather one that was birthed out of the 1980s economic climate and 
given a different and perhaps more lasting life line during the ESAP years (Sanders, 
Cousins and Moore, 2007). While foreign exchange was merely diverted from formal 
and state structures during the 1980s owing to strict RBZ controls, in the 1990s the 
effect of the IMF enforced reforms was to encourage individuals to bring money into 
the Bank but also make it possible to speculate and make readily available funds to 
those operating in the parallel market. In the post ESAP era, where the RBZ has 
revisited tight foreign exchange controls, the parallel market witnessed resurgence 
and in fact now controls the unofficial exchange rates as well as determines prices for 











These economic circumstances have affected the Zimbabwean society in its 
entirety, albeit to differing extents. Many reports state that the inflation both official 
and unofficial will have reached levels that will collapse the economy entirely 
(Munoz, 2007: 4/5). What is clear is that while the economy is in dire straits the 
political atmosphere is severely affected. Some of these political problems expressed 
through government repression are: Firstly government policy on mass or large group 
gatherings without prior clearance from the authorities which has resulted in 
Zimbabweans being denied avenues to gather through the Public Order and Security 
Act (POSA) (Sachikonye, 2002: 18). This reveals another missed opportunity for 
manipulating openings. 
Another is extreme limitations of freedom of the press. It is problematic that 
only state sponsored media has a primary place in communicating news. This has 
been achieved through Access to Information and Privacy Act (AIPA), a policy that 
could have been circumvented had IFIs sufficiently and timeously responded to state 
repression (Sachikonye, 2002: 18). On the part of the MDC their faults are founded in 
their appropriating the single voice of opposition, in effect replicating the tactics and 
characteristics of the ZANU-PF. Their factional divisions along ethnic and ideological 
lines and failure to rally around needs based as opposed to patronage based issues 
makes them no different from ZANU-PF (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 117). 
This paper argues that the replication of nationalist rhetoric, positioning 
themselves as the sole saviours of the nation from the patrimonial nationalism, affects 
freedom of the press. Many newspapers such as The Daily News rooted themselves in 
support of the MDC and so resulted in firstly a deviation from the ideals of 
communicating the views of the majority of Zimbabweans, propagating the pro-West 
sentiment of the MDC as well as creating a rigid dichotomy of voices as pro MDC or 
pro ZANU within the media. As such one can say that the ESAP manifested moment 
to reinvigorate the democratisation process in Zimbabwe was missed, if not ignored. 
Where ESAP presented adverse economic effects for the people, political 
opportunities were not capitalised on. 
Elections are a third political consideration. Debates around the extent to 











contributed to the questioning of subsequent contestation In Zimbabwe. Such 
questioning is based on violence and intimidation mostly attributed to ruling party 
youths in the times leading up to and during elections (Bush & Szeftel, 2002: 8). It 
must be noted that such violence and intimidation is not only meted out by ruling 
party youth militias, it is well known that opposition MDC youth militias also partook 
and continue to partake in violent and intimidatory activities (Raftopoulos et aI, 2006: 
11 ). 
Electoral issues are important because their endorsement is reflective of 
democracy. Elections affected by minimal disturbances are accepted by IFIs and other 
groups as a measure of democracy (Lip set, 1993: 431). A caveat is necessary here. 
Though elections in the 1990s were mostly accepted as free and fair, since 
parliamentary elections in 2001, the international community has begun to declare 
most elections not free and not fair with blame for this being placed on the ZANU 
regime (Bush & Szeftel, 2002: 10). 
At this juncture it is necessary to question the sincerity and commitment to 
democracy of international actors. Despite their determination to see open 
contestation, it is important to understand that merely insisting on these minimum 
standards and throwing support behind the MDC does not equate to a renewed interest 
in political opening in Zimbabwe. Rather it is simply their support of an opposition 
that is partial to neo-liberal economic policies. 
A fourth consideration is the crisis of legitimacy prevalent within the 
leadership of Zimbabwe (Lloyd, 2002: 223). It is true that the ZANU-PF as a party 
have a legislative majority as well as executive control. This guarantees the regime 
both power and authority over the population. Whether ZANU has legitimacy 
(rightful rule) is questionable. John Locke would claim that the ZANU regime 
through failing to deliver on its promises to the Zimbabwean people has broken its 
social contract and there is therefore a crisis of legitimacy (Moyo, 2002: 5; Spragens, 
1997: 31). Thomas Hobbes on the other hand would claim that because the situation 
has not resulted in the people rising up in violent protest, the government has retained 
authority (the right to rule) over them (Spragens, 1997: 33). The government which is 











It is the contention of this paper, that despite calls to the contrary, the ZANU-
PF led government is legitimate (Lloyd, 2002: 223). Despite being declared not free 
and not fair, elections have taken place and have resulted in ZANU-PF being selected 
as the rulers of the people. It must be added that despite international actors distaste 
for the incumbent regime, systems put in place and entrenched through their policies 
of economic and political reform have made Mugabe, his cabinet and the party the 
legitimate, albeit by default - representatives of the nation. Their legitimacy however, 
remains precarious and questioned; many of their actions are as a response to this. 
It must be noted however that a crisis of legitimacy is not confined to the 
ruling elite but has also affected the opposition MDC. Evidence of this lies in the fact 
that the MDC's strength as the most seemingly viable opposition to a post-nationalist 
state is informed by its support from external agents and has already been discussed 
(Moore: 8). What is important to note in relation to ESAP is that had IFIs and other 
international actors been genuinely committed to supporting opposition and 
concerned about the majority of Zimbabweans, they would have been careful to 
support a party that had not only been closely affiliated but grown out of the ZANU-
PF. The split of the MDC into two separate factions is merely evidence of the 
characteristics of the ruling party being inherent within the opposition (Moyo & 
Yeros,2007: 116). 
The best example of this is the failure of MDC leaders to rise above personal 
differences and issues of accumulating power to focus on entrenching democracy and 
offering viable political alternatives to the Zimbabwean public (Raftopoulos et aI, 
2006: 18). One can postulate that had the MDC had a genuine desire to see change 
come to Zimbabwe and every Zimbabwean have a right to decide on their 
representatives, they would have decided from the outset to participate in the 2006 
Senate elections; again, an opportune moment to alter the political playing field was 
missed (Raftopoulos et aI, 2006: 2011). 
Further, this crisis of legitimacy is most evident in the government's dealing 
with the informal sector and informal settlements. Though the genesis of the crisis of 
informal trade and settlement is in ESAP in the current crisis this issue has resurfaced. 











reckoned with, the state through municipal governments turned a blind eye to the 
increase of non-registered informal traders because of the realities of the effects of 
ESAP (Brand et aI, 1995: 136). 
'Operation Murambatsvina' also known as 'Operation Clean Up the Filth' 
instituted by the government in 2005 is a direct result of this particular impact of 
structural adjustment in Zimbabwe; though perhaps with a more political dimension 
when it comes to its relation to democracy. The authorities' demolition of 
unregistered and illegal construction in the form of housing and businesses and 
markets was aimed at limiting the government's urban opposition (Moyo & Yeros, 
2007: 1131115). Although deemed anti-democratic and a violation of human rights 
this move was a direct result of poverty exacerbating ESAP and the government was 
able to justify their action through their anti-imperial and nationalist rhetoric; this 
response to their legitimacy crisis worked to either silence or remove the threat of 
opposition in the urban centres. 
The crisis of legitimacy as a result of ESAP and the accompanying poverty 
and fall in standards of living has also led to mass emigration from Zimbabwe to 
neighbouring Botswana, South Africa and Namibia as well as the United Kingdom, 
the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The large number of 
Zimbabweans fleeing the effects of economic adversity in their country presents 
democracy with a dilemma. There has been massive brain drain and the most likely 
section of the population to effectively bring about change, especially in terms of 
contributing to economic development and hence political change, are in the 
Diaspora. It is estimated that approximately five million Zimbabweans are living 
outside of Zimbabwe (Saunders, Cousins & Moore, 2007). In democracy's terms, this 
means the loss of at least five million Zimbabweans that are unable to vote and 
possibly act in such a way as to contribute to significant change in the country or to 
use their skills to changing the economy. 
Lastly, MDC's affiliation and close relationship with international actors has 
probably represented the most pernicious effect on Zimbabwe's democracy (Bond & 
Manyanya, 2002: 82). These close ties represent an assault on democracy by de-











virtue of its terrible outcomes, ESAP, as with SAPs in other African countries, had 
embedded a justifiable suspicion of entities external to the continent in the minds of 
the population (Bush & Szeftel, 2002: 12). Added to the general effects of ESAP is 
the belief that the West in the form of Britain the former colonial master, had been 
responsible for the plight of the people through colonialism as well as delaying and 
outright refusing to compensate white farmers for land and thus prevent Zimbabweans 
from creating wealth. It can be said that Zimbabwean people were very wary of neo-
imperialism and the very real idea of continued control of their destinies by 
imperialist westerners as it had already happened twice with awful results (Bush and 
Szeftel, 2002: 12). 
It therefore seems very odd that the MDC, having emerged from a movement 
that bemoaned the effects of neo-liberalism would forge alliances with agencies that 
represented these ideals and more (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 11617). The fact is that had 
the MDC actually wanted democracy to flourish or even have a chance in Zimbabwe, 
they would have firmly distanced themselves from the West. Instead, they have 
allowed themselves to be tried and found wanting when accused of cavorting with 
neo-imperialist Britain and America (Bond & Manyanya, 2002: xv). The MDC has 
thus inadvertently given added credence to Mugabe's tirades with regard the West and 
positioned him, through ZANU, as the African voice to remind the continent of the 
underhanded ways of the developed world. 
It is not to dispute or deem dubious the sincerity of Mugabe's admonitions of 
the west, but simply to emphasise that these could be made in a way that prioritises 
and changes the plight of Zimbabweans. For the sake of continuing protest against 
SAPs and neo-liberalism, MDC should have distanced itself from the west in all ways 
possible. Again such comments are made so as to emphasise the missed opportunity, 
to not necessarily see ZANU defeated and MDC as the ruling party, but rather to 
usher in a time of vibrant political competition and participation by many sectors of 
Zimbabwean society. 
Thus to conclude, despite declarations from varIOUS fronts that the 
Zimbabwean government did not correctly implement ESAP and did not comply with 











as reports by the IFIs to the contrary (Bond, 1999: 18). If any problems in ESAP's 
implementation existed, these were largely informed by the IFI's delay in making 
funds available for reform and hence development. Other problems that resulted in 
ESAP's failure are associated with the politics of reform. Because the economic 
effects of ESAP were negative and affected the greater majority of the population that 
represented the traditional power base of the ruling ZANU-PF and the reform 
instituting government, resistance to reforms began spelling out a crisis of legitimacy 
for the state. 
Zimbabwe was not the first developing country to adopt and implement SAPs 
and neither will it be the last to implement neo-liberal economic reforms, even in their 
renewed modem day form. It is at this juncture that one draws attention to Bretton 
Woods' institutions failure to prepare for the harsh effects of ESAP on the most 
vulnerable groups in society and the possible compromises that would be made by the 
ruling elite so as to avoid losing political tenure. So, in spite of government's response 
in the form of repression to the crisis of legitimacy it remains that that the IFIs and 
donor community in general, by firstly turning a blind eye to the effects of ESAP and 
insisting on the programme's completion, as well as benignly tolerating and accepting 
government's repressive measures, acted to repress Zimbabwe's democracy, were 
party to violating Zimbabweans human rights and deprived the Zimbabwean 
population of viable development opportunities. 
IFIs as well as the opposition MDC which emerged from the ESAP regime, 
ignored the moment of political change and in fact closed it by their silence (in the 
case of the former) and overplayed their hand and missed the opportunity to transform 
the political system (in the case of the latter). Sachikonye (2002: 18) rightfully states 
that "the politics of electioneering in Zimbabwe in the period 2000 - 2002 showed 
how increasingly authoritarian a regime under concerted opposition challenge can 
become. This repressive response grows the bigger the opposition challenge." Here it 
becomes evident that IFIs insistence and external actors' determination to direct 
political liberalisation resulted in closing the space for successful democratisation, or 











The IMF and World Bank cannot institute or demand politicalliberalisation, it 
has to be grown from beneath, by individuals, Zimbabwean individuals. The MDC 
did not accurately anticipate the length of time it would take to achieve change, they 
did not and perhaps still do not have a long term view to change. One does not 
discount the possibility of a coup or a defeat of the ruling party in an election, it 
would still remain that the MDC would have not achieved the necessary change; a 
change that reflects the desires of the people and allows for the articulation of a 
beneficial development agenda. As such civil society and Zimbabweans at large are 












RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSIONS 
4.1 Inequalities in the global political economy - the effects of neo-
liberalism 
The broader basis of this project is that the nature of the global political economy 
does not allow for economically developing and politically transitional countries to 
achieve sufficient and sustainable results, in other words stable and competitive 
markets and vibrant established democracies. As such there is a desperate need for a 
redefining of the global political economic context in such a way that sees the 
continent benefit from globalisation. The work posits that there is no veracity to the 
liberal notion that the global economy is advantageous to all parties, there is 
insufficient evidence that developing economies have benefited from inclusion in the 
global economy (Gourevitch, 1978: 892). 
Zimbabwe's experience with structural adjustment in the form of ESAP is 
evidence of the above. Interlocking economic and political effects of reform confirm 
it. One such effect discussed in the case study is the decline of the manufacturing 
industry soon after ESAP because of a failure to compete in unequal global markets 
(Dansereau, 2003: 181). The Zimbabwean government implemented reform under 
duress. By removing most barriers to trade they exposed the economy to the threat of 
decline. This paper has tried to show that this decline was not directly a result of 
ESAP, but rather was guaranteed by any decision to veer from ESAP's path that the 
government would take. The rapidly implemented and minimally debated policies 
added to the latent economic dilemmas of the 1970s Rhodesian government and 
served to weaken the flimsy foundation of the economy culminating in the modem 
day crisis. 
That African countries (as well as other developing countries) themselves need 
to institute reforms and changes is indisputable, but why should they alone be the 
ones to change? Such requirements will only lead to the cementing of unequal global 











cannot be expected to adjust so as to fit into the global economy but that global 
market forces need to adjust through firm commitments to international agreements 
that correspond to the needs of people globally and most especially Africans. Eyoh 
and Sandbrook (2001: 33) argue that the status quo is not a naturally arrived at 
outcome of technological change as many globalists would argue (Mcgrew, 2003: 
23). Rather it is a constructed state arrived at through "negotiated inter-governmental 
agreements"; as such, reconstruction into a different state is possible. 
However, in Zimbabwe, the ordinances of the global economic structures had 
failed to ward off economic and political calamity both during and after ESAP (Saul, 
2005: 258). Thus it is necessary to make a call for a change in the global political 
economy. A core premise of this paper is as Gourevitch (1978:911) explains that "the 
international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and structures" but 
more importantly, a source of them. In the case of Zimbabwe there was no alternative 
to this path, especially owing to the inheritance of a skewed economy and the 
Lancaster House agreement. Saul has sentiments that follow along these lines; he 
suggests that any emancipatory development in the continent must take place along a 
type of social revolutionary aspect (Saul, 2005: 257). The intensity of Zimbabwe's 
protracted crises necessitates this. Therefore, simply reforming Zimbabwe is not an 
option; a radical change, that extends to other African countries and then to a 
transformation of the global political economy, is crucial. 
4.2 Revival of Zimbabwe's democracy 
With the failures of ESAP, the Zimbabwean government that had dealt repressively 
with opposition parties and civil society groups faced a legitimacy crisis that resulted 
in the abandonment of SAPs in the country thus clearly showing the linkages between 
the economic and the political. This paper has touched on Zimbabwe's democracy. 
Highlighting that in the early 1990s, when the rest of the continent was going through 
the 'third wave' of democracy, Zimbabwe was largely considered democratic, albeit a 











The importance of this lies in the effect of the economIC on the 
political and its relationship to current crisis in Zimbabwe. As already mentioned, 
ESAP's economic outcomes served as a simultaneous opening and closing of political 
space. This seeming contradiction should not be understood as claiming that SAPs 
have an element of positiveness, because they result in agitation for change. The 
opposite is true. Of significance is that while SAPs and other neo-liberal policies 
result in economic adversity, the extent to which the by-products of their 
implementation, such as the rise of civil society movements and the like should be 
recognised is great. IFIs and other creditors engaged in Zimbabwe should take 
cognisance of this. 
Zimbabwe reqUIres democracy to evolve in a direction that emphasises a 
development agenda and focuses on the greater good of the population. Lipset (1993: 
432) states that "a free market needs democracy" and that a democracy needs a free 
market. It is clear that in many African cases economic development is lauded as 
being a precondition for democracy and the existence of a free market being an 
indication of economic development. This paper has attempted to show that "free 
market" or neo-liberal notions of development are not relevant to the African context. 
Therefore with regard democracy, Africa will need a social developmental market to 
support her social or people centred democracy. The term social democracy borrowed 
from Chabal (2002: 461) is used to simply emphasise the need for African political 
systems to allow for consultation with and participation of the people. 
In Zimbabwe's context such a democracy will entail either a new generation in 
the ruling party (ZANU-PF) or the opposition party (MOC) to exploit the gaps left by 
the ruling party in the current crisis. It will also entail Zimbabwean civil society being 
pro-active as opposed to reactive to government, opposition or external actors' 
political machinations. Civil society at this point in Zimbabwe is the only group able 
to agitate for change in peaceful ways the effect of changing institutions and the very 
foundations of the political system, what Moyo and Yeros (2007: 117) describe as 
radicalising the state. This radicalising must maintain a developmental aim and steer 












Zimbabwe reqUIres less reliance on external (western) funding for its 
development. John Saul (2005: 262/3) suggests that such distancing is based on 
imagining "the radically possible" and would require a country like Zimbabwe in this 
"next liberation struggle" to take note and align itself to alternative groups. The 
danger here however, is that these alternatives can be worse than the ones before, the 
trick is thus to find alternative support that assists to lobby, fund raise and strategise 
for development in a way that does not exploit and make states dependent on it. 
The crisis that currently besets the Zimbabwean people requires redress of 
both the economic and political systems. In Zimbabwe's context, as in any other 
African country, the requirement is for Zimbabweans to change the system 
themselves. This will entail identifying opportunities for wealth creation, sustainable 
wealth creation not the opportunistic looting currently taking place in the economy. 
An area where this is possible but requiring co-operation from various actors is the 
area of land redistribution (Moyo & Yeros, 2007: 117). Successful land redistribution 
will lead to Zimbabwean individuals coming to know and articulate their economic 
and political options, thus participating in their own democracy and development. 
4.3 Final Remarks 
This work has brought together discussion of African prospects of democracy and 
whether they are enabled, enhanced or hindered by neo-liberal economic policy 
reforms - structural adjustment programmes. It has questioned the prospect of 
successful development and hence democratisation under conditions of adjustment, 
postulating that SAPs have had limited success in the continent and in effect have 
done no favours for democracy. As seen in the Zimbabwe case, SAPs because of their 
adverse economic and social impact had an added political impact, part of which was 
exacerbating political rifts in the ruling party, ushering in political resistance and 
protest against government decisions to reform, rallying together of civil society and 
the labour union (ZCTU) as well as the birth of a threatening opposition party. This 
political effect has been summarised as presenting a new direction for Zimbabwe's 
democratic trajectory and an opportunity for a people-centred democracy of sorts to 











outlined above, that SAPs are intrinsically designed to make democracy fail because 
of the manner in which implementing governments are dictated to without 
consultation of the people. The second reason is that international actors, IFIs and 
their representative governments and donor agencies tum a blind eye to repressive 
measures taken by reforming governments, in their attempts to complete reforms. 
Inevitably reforms are abandoned and the state remains with an even greater external 
debt, reversals in development and the institutions of democracy are eroded as was the 
case in Zimbabwe. 
Thus, development and democracy need to be engaged in differently; especially 
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